Saturday, September 30, 2017

愛情靈藥 (2002)

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rvpqcnySBB4



本來以為是日本片直到看到那個苦口婆心(老師跟你說老師是有經驗的小有小的好處而且老師跟你說它會長大變大的來把褲子脫下來讓老師看看)的折疊氣球才確定這是台灣片

老古和文西


老古說文西你最近忙些甚麼

文西說叫我達文西替婊子做功德

老古說文西聽起來很真實(authentic)

文西說我是最後一個找到真實的台灣人

老古說佩服佩服

文西說不過替婊子做功德之餘我也讀史

老古說婊子和歷史說來聽聽

文西說駭人聽聞的人和事過去百年

老古說過去百年我只知道柯建銘段宜康顧立雄四行倉庫搬運兩億台幣和MG149的重量和波多野結衣

文西顯然知道歷史的重點說波多野結衣很重要

老古陷入懷念的回憶的表情說可惜有點年紀了

東北季風



東北季風來了席地而臥的人知道從骨裡知道 Matt Elliott 也知道雖然我不知道

他是怎麼知道野柚一地廢院不想講Otto Gross Ernesto Spinelli Jessica Benjamin Robert Galatzer-Levy In Search of Authenticity

 

Yes, that damned authenticity 講些甚麼好呢張博樹馮勝平李一平蘆笛吳仁華蘇曉康廖亦武風大 

遂知落葉  不須掃   直到蚊多

歷史學家的看到   是看到人世的局

哲學家的看到   是看到形上的局

心理治療者的看到   是看到內心的局

生意人的看到   是看到利益的局

玩政人的看到   是看到權力的局

吊詭的是   無病無痛   太平盛世   什麼都看不到

症狀難熬   崩塌毀滅   我們是在廢墟中   才學會看到

廢墟中   我們學到的第一個字是無奈   第二個字是不甘無奈   第三個字是畢竟無奈   第四個字是so be it

 

直到說出第四個字   我們終於學會   那個要命的第五個字 
authenticity

一開始是裝的後來越裝越像真的

http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/2208926

政治是高明的騙術這是呂秀蓮說的高明的騙術是高明的表演術這是豬哥亮說的高明的表演術需要高明的觀眾鼓掌這是柯文哲說的

譚松

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YPU0CXV6av4

http://news.sina.com.tw/article/20170930/24100700.html

https://cn.nytimes.com/china/20170929/cc29-tansong/zh-hant/

在川東忠縣有一對夫婦叫黎大雪和肖正靜,他們是工商業兼地主,在他們所有財產都交完了而土改民兵仍然酷刑追逼時,他們只有自殺。

這對夫婦是手牽著手一步步走向長江,走向死亡的。

Thursday, September 28, 2017

波子憲改


中文諸子在台灣都混不下去了孔子孟子洗廁所的慘況我先前說過別的諸子更不在話下取而代之的台灣瞎掰文化復興當然是豬子波子和其他族繁不及備載的那些(龜兒)子們剛剛看電視波子林子大聲的在談憲改總結如下投票年齡下修為三歲只有政治正確的人可以投票或不投政治正確的票的人就要進焚化爐廢行政院考試院監察院立法院設洗錢院東廠院種族清洗院簡而言之非內閣制非總統制採山口組制治國

authenticity

 
必然是被具體的生命情境逼出來的尋找與普世經驗有關的叫做The Age of Absurdiy: Why Modern Life Makes It Hard To Be Happy (Michael Foley, 2010)postmodern malaise與台灣在地有關的叫做兩岸的局為什麼必然是具體的因為抽象的理智的建構不能不是lure for closure換句話說有標準答案藏在最後一章In Search of Authenticity: Existentialism from Kierkegaard to Camus (Jacob Golomb, 1995)將此尋找歸於文學我說過現在的問題是In Search of Authenticity After Camus我們需要小說家來照亮這個問題我們需要每一個人面對自己的這個問題我先前說過這樣的人就是有趣的人


 

Jóhann Jóhannsson - Escape

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L4ljmowphvI&list=RDjJ8TnlNpatk&index=3

from "And In The Endless Pause There Came The Sound Of Bees" (2009)

界限


是一個浮動的概念

意思是說昨天的界限

恰恰就是今天的出發點

 

當然沒有人事先知道

今天太陽下山的時候

你到底前行了幾英吋

 

意思是說昨天的界限

很有可能仍是今天的

 

曾有幾次趨近界限的經驗

倏忽即逝的察覺它在那裡

 

現在我終於知道

下次要停留在那裡良久



某君住在石牌路一段   一九七九年夏天  寫了一封信   給住在石牌路二段友人   約他在二零一七年秋天一晤   昨天友人收到這封信  決定寫一封回信   問某君到底在那裡碰面   估計這封回信   二零三四年會寄到

這件事   說明了什麼是自然   地質學的自然   和這個自然是偶然的

豬子曰



豬子曾在台灣島內跑路多年從未被媒體狗仔警察臨檢找到堪稱台灣跑路界之高手中的高手他大隱於市自修苦學撰台灣史九十卷行世豬子學現已為島內顯學中研院及諸大學已設豬子學系所研究發揚光大豬子學()台灣()故宮正舉辦豬子大展豬子曰台灣的源起遠遠早於一般所謂人類文明源起的全新世(Holocene)早在五十萬年前一個不喜歡刷牙的埃及人搭乘長榮航空來台然後不停繁衍至今

我們台灣有蔡子賴子柯子豬子波子

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wq7c4MZGKZ0

阿里斯多德說豬(哥亮)子是我最崇拜的台灣人波(多野結衣)子是台灣人最崇拜的日本人孔子孟子則是在台灣總督府洗廁所的兩個小弟對免治廁所維護保養有專門研究

那個年代


據說已經過去

據說正在發生

據說即將重演

 

劉大任看著夕陽

想起四和如意

 

捨不得用的勃起的回憶呢

 

今天的小屁孩們擅長勃起

和堅信勃起一定要有代價

 

小屁孩王小明說

我知道大任是誰

 

育卉老師教過我們

大任是孟子的表弟

天將降大任於斯人也

與此同時


異鄉遇異鄉人

 

然後雙方問自

我是誰你是誰

 

我從那裡來我怎麼來到這裡我要去那裡

你從那裡來你怎麼來到這裡你要去那裡

 

那晚七等生來到墾丁賓館召妓

結果召了他多年前教過的小學生

夜渡資清晨留在桌上他才猛然想起

 

匆匆往北尋找人間失去的天真

 

這件事發生在七零年代的台灣

 

今天的小屁孩們記性都很好

不會發生這種搞了半天互相

才猛然想起匆匆往北的戲碼

 

他們的天真三歲那年

就已經沖進免治馬桶

Monday, September 25, 2017

平常


說平常的話

做平常的活

食平常的餐

臥平常的覺

想平常的事

 

五個平常等於

還是平常

 

他們說毀滅在即

我從來沒有想過

逃到溫哥華床下

 

席地而臥

非床上而臥

亦非床下而臥

 

最後一小時

我點起紙菸

度過una mattina

Authenticity




1.  Bad faith (Sartre)

2.   Be true to oneself vs. self-deception

3.   Courage (to be) (Tillich) (Dare to be)

4.   Dare to act

5.   Death – the final coming to rest

6.   Folly and remorse

7.   Beyond redemption

8.   No Heidegger this time

9.   Not sure if psychoanalysis is helpful or relevant

10.  In Search of Authenticity: Existentialism from Kierkegaard to Camus (Problems of Modern European Thought), by Jacob Golomb, Routledge, 1995 (questia, scribd pdf)

11.  Now, a la Jacob Golomb, it is about ethics (not metaphysical at all, in other words)

12.  And, since it is about ethics, it is about dilemma and choice, both of which are so very personal, and quite inconsequential in terms of the progress of the HISTORY

13.  Therefore, this is about anti-hero

14. Now, our problem is, in search of authenticity, after camus

15. Interestingly, the two thinkers who adopted an ontological approach to authenticity both went through a kind of midlife Umkehr or conversion: Heidegger, from the phenomenological ontology of Dasein to the poetry and mysticism of Being, and Sartre, from phenomenological ontology to politics. (p. 92)

16. like Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, not a philosopher in the technical or academic sense, Camus expresses ideas and dilemmas that are intimately related to the ideal of authenticity (p. 119)

17. Unlike Kierkegaard, who entices us to take an absurd leap of faith, Camus rejects transcendence, adopts a position of strict immanence3 and invites us to live out a rebellious acceptance of our absurd fate. He encourages us to win authenticity by ‘an act of lucidity as one makes an act of faith’ (LACE, p. 81). This illuminates the dilemma that confronted all the thinkers we have considered: the singularity and the spontaneity of the ideal of authenticity imply a clash with the prevailing ethic; yet to resolve this impasse by granting authenticity a recognized social meaning in turn neutralizes this spontaneity by forcing it into a fixed ontological yoke. In any event, however, Camus rejects this solution since ontology is meaningless in an absurd world. (p. 119)

18. Sisyphian life in the face of the absurd is the only authentic attitude available to mortals who reject suicide and proudly affirm their lives. (p.120)

19. Camus’s two major philosophical essays, The Myth of Sisyphus and The Rebel, are philosophical commentaries on his understanding of authenticity as it is portrayed in his novels, short stories and plays. …By generating in us deep existential anguish, Camus’s fiction offers us a chance to overcome it by being true to ourselves for the sake of humanity. ‘This is why any authentic creation is a gift to the future’ (MS, p. 169). (p. 120)

20. The answer…is this: even if one does not believe in God, suicide is not legitimate…even within the limits of nihilism it is possible to find the means to proceed beyond nihilism…. The Myth of Sisyphus…sums itself up for me as a lucid invitation to live and to create, in the very midst of the desert. (p. 122)

21. Hence Camus recommends acceptance and affirmation of life even if it lacks transcendent meaning. The solution to absurdity is not to escape to philosophy or suicide, but, rather, to accept it as a given. The sober and creative life is the authentic solution and indicates an authentic overcoming. To Camus’s generation the war had given little reason to be hopeful; Camus, like Nietzsche before him, offers hope without reason as the authentic reaction to the absurdity of immanence embodied in the myth of Sisyphus. Like the Nietzschean Übermensch, who adopts the existential formula of amor fati, ‘the absurd man says yes’ (ibid., p. 99).

22. Like Nietzsche, he demands that we liberate ourselves from the yearning for salvation by overcoming our nostalgia for it. Camus’s determination to withhold from us any ‘metaphysics of consolation’ (ibid., p. 42) makes authenticity all the more vital since in his eyes it is the only solution capable of withstanding the feeling of absurdity. (p. 124)

23. Even if suicide merely indicates resigned acceptance of the harsh implications of the relationship between the individual and the world and not the overcoming of this absurd—so what? It might be claimed that physical suicide is not the solution, since it creates a hierarchy of values within which there is one sort of action of ultimate value. In other words, to commit suicide can be seen as preferring one course of action over all others. But if our existence is sheer absurdity, why would suicide be any more valuable than Dr Rieux’s useless efforts to cure his patients in The Plague? (p. 125)

24. Camus knows that he has no valid argument against suicide. Suicide is an issue subject to the discretion of each individual who confronts the feeling of absurdity. Camus claims that we can ‘escape suicide’ to the extent that we are ‘simultaneously awareness and rejection of death’ (ibid., p. 60). The latter attitude is the ‘revolt’ that gives life its ‘value’ (ibid.)—its authenticity, the only possible value given the absurd. This ‘majestic’ revolt has ‘something exceptional’ about it, for, Camus feels, it displays ‘human pride’ (ibid., p. 48). It is not coincidental that at that point in his essay Camus begins to use first-person sentences such as ‘I must carry…the weight of my own life alone’ (ibid.).

25. Camus, following Nietzsche, declares: I embrace a lucid and sober attitude, since I want to attain authenticity, to live intensely but without ‘stage-sets’ that distort my selfhood; hence I turn away from suicide which will prevent me from engaging in revolt, the practical embodiment of authenticity. (p. 125)

26. Thus the feeling and notion of absurdity and the constant struggle against their nihilistic implications are necessary conditions of authenticity. ‘I am authentic ergo it is absurd’ is Camus’s existential version of the Cartesian Cogito. ‘Only from chaos is a star born’, Nietzsche claims; and Camus develops this idea, maintaining that only from the feeling of absurdity and from the complex sensations that constitute its pathos is the aspiration to authenticity born. This happens when the ‘stage-sets’ of normative ethics ‘collapse’ and the question of where to go—‘suicide or recovery’ (ibid., p. 18)—becomes inescapable. (pp. 125-126)

27. According to Camus, no ethical rule can be sustained in an absurd world. ‘What rule, then, could emanate from that unreasonable order?’ (ibid., p. 58) asks Camus, and answers: ‘There can be no question of holding forth on ethics. I have seen people behave badly with great morality and I note every day that integrity has no need of rules’ (ibid., p. 57). Here Camus alludes to the many self-proclaimed moralists who preach at the city’s gates while themselves eschewing morality. He describes them as having ‘clean’ consciences, because they never use them. For Camus, the ideal of integrity, or, in Nietzschean language, truthfulness in life, stands above the objective ethical norms of honesty and sincerity. Authenticity reigns ‘beyond good and evil’; it does not require, nor can it have, ethical rules for the rational justification of actions. Authenticity is a personal, intuitive morality that springs from freedom and spontaneity without any external a priori dictates of Reason, God or History. The authority of authenticity lies in itself. (p. 127)

28. To conclude is to reach an end together, but the authentic posture, as understood by the philosophers of authenticity, forbids me from presuming to conclude for you or for us. Each individual has to come to her own conclusions about authenticity. In fact, encouraging you to ponder this existential issue and to entice you into drawing your own conclusions is a central objective of this book. As Nietzsche advises us through Zarathustra, ‘if you would go high, use your own legs’. (p. 143)

29. From the historical perspective, however, the intuitive and individual routes to authenticity seem to be more viable and productive than the ontological-phenomenological approaches. (p. 143)

30. Authenticity calls for an ongoing life of significant actions. It is actions that shape our authenticity. The thinkers we have looked at preferred action, or Heideggerian ‘care’, to reflection (which, Kierkegaard claims, ‘freezes action’) and knowledge (which ‘kills action’ according to Nietzsche). But meaningful activity is only possible in the context of intersubjective interaction, namely, within society. (pp. 143-144)

31. Authenticity, we saw, is best forged and revealed in ‘boundary’ or extreme existential situations. Yet such circumstances presuppose a social context. (p. 144)

32. The literature on authenticity abounds in descriptions of conflicts between individuals acting on different ethical maxims. These conflicts highlight the need for resolute and authentic decisions and spontaneous actions. Nietzsche and Kierkegaard argue that one knows what one is only after realizing what one is not. (p. 144)

33. But can authenticity, thus understood, ever be implemented? Here too we have looked at some convincing arguments to the effect that authenticity is highly problematic at best. (p. 144)

34. In his study of authenticity, Charles Taylor warns against an unrestrained, egocentric individualism. His sympathetic attitude to the ideal of authenticity as countering the ‘malaises of modernity’1 is remarkable evidence that the issue is far from having been closed by Camus, or, for that matter, by the present study, which stresses the aesthetic model of authenticity.2 (p. 145)

35. There is today a grave danger that we are facing the death of authenticity. Poststructuralist thought and the other currently fashionable streams of what is vaguely called ‘postmodernism’ attempt to dissolve the subjective pathos of authenticity which lies at the heart of existentialist concern. This study should be seen as an attempt to redress the postmodernistic devaluation of the authentic self by embarking on historical reconstruction. (pp. 145-146)

36. Let me end with a personal vision expressed in terms of a musical analogy. I envisage a society of authentic individuals as analogous to an orchestra without a conductor, where each individual plays her own composition. Sometimes one member of the ensemble will be in tune with the others, but not always. There is only one proviso: no one composition can overcome the others, and no player can suppress another’s self-expression. From the outside, the music produced by these individuals sounds like sheer cacophony, but for the participants each of their pieces has meaning, while the music played by the others functions as the inevitable background against which they struggle to perfect their original melodies. (p. 146)

37. Finally, let us recall Kierkegaard’s historical description of the emergence of the authentic ideal: ‘With every turning point in history there are two movements to be observed. On the one hand, the new shall come forth; on the other, the old must be displaced.’4 At these turningpoints we will encounter the authentic individual. Just as the decline of the ethic of objectivity set in motion the appeal for authenticity, so the decline of the ethic of subjectivity in the postmodern era, and the suppression of individuality encouraged by the mass media and multinational markets, will invigorate the quest for authenticity as a personal, corrective ideal if not an objectively viable norm. Only the return to our authentic pathos can prevent the betrayal of what is dearest to each of us: our own selfhood. (pp. 146-147)