Jane Bennett does not directly address the concept of human evilness toward other humans as a primary focus in her work. Her political philosophy in Vibrant Matter and related writings leans more toward understanding the distributed nature of agency, the vitality of matter, and how humans and nonhumans coexist and affect one another. However, there are some ways her ideas indirectly engage with the topic of human harm toward other humans:
1. Distributed Responsibility in Assemblages:
• Bennett emphasizes that human actions are rarely isolated; they emerge from and are shaped by complex assemblages of humans and nonhumans.
• This perspective complicates traditional notions of individual moral responsibility, which are central to discussions of human harm or “evilness.”
• While she doesn’t excuse harm, her framework suggests that many forms of violence or oppression arise not solely from individual intent but from systemic, collective forces.
2. Dehumanization and Objectification:
• Although Bennett focuses on the agency of nonhuman matter, her ideas can be extended to critique how humans objectify and instrumentalize one another, treating others as “inert” or without agency.
• This dehumanization might be interpreted as a form of evil, as it denies the vitality and dignity of other human beings.
3. Neglect of Interconnectedness:
• Bennett critiques anthropocentric systems that fail to recognize the interconnectedness of all beings. This neglect can extend to the way humans harm each other by prioritizing self-interest or narrow group interests.
• Systems of exploitation, oppression, or violence might be seen as emerging from this lack of recognition, though she doesn’t explicitly frame these acts as “evil.”
4. Ethical Failures and Harm:
• While Bennett avoids moralistic language, she acknowledges that ethical failures—such as failing to attune to the agency and needs of others, whether human or nonhuman—can lead to significant harm.
• This framework can be applied to analyze how systemic inequalities, war, or exploitation perpetuate human suffering.
5. Political Implications of Vital Materialism:
• In her broader political philosophy, Bennett calls for an ethical orientation that acknowledges the shared vitality and agency of all beings.
• In the context of human relations, this implies fostering systems that promote mutual respect, care, and recognition of others’ vitality—human harm could be seen as arising from a failure to embrace this ethos.
6. The Role of Human Will and Desire:
• While Bennett focuses on distributed agency, she doesn’t deny that humans play an active role in shaping harm.
• The human capacity for greed, domination, or exploitation—especially within political or economic systems—can perpetuate violence and oppression. However, she tends to analyze these phenomena as outcomes of broader assemblages rather than intrinsic human “evil.”
Bennett’s Approach to Human Evilness:
Instead of framing human harm as “evil” in a traditional, moralistic sense, Bennett’s work suggests the following:
• Harm arises from failures to recognize and respect interconnectedness.
• Systems of violence and exploitation are co-produced by human and nonhuman forces (e.g., ideologies, technologies, environments).
• Ethical and political solutions require addressing these systemic, assemblage-based roots of harm.
What is Missing?
If you’re looking for a more direct exploration of human evilness, particularly in terms of moral responsibility or intentional harm (e.g., genocide, slavery, interpersonal violence), Bennett’s work might not provide a full account. Philosophers like Hannah Arendt (The Origins of Totalitarianism), Emmanuel Levinas (Ethics and Infinity), or Judith Butler (Frames of War) might better address these themes in the context of human-to-human harm. However, Bennett’s perspective can complement such discussions by offering a broader, systemic lens.