This is a crucial and complex question—one that traces the deep genealogical tensions within continental philosophy since the mid-20th century. The short answer is: no, structuralism and poststructuralism did not simply leave phenomenology behind, though they critically reworked, displaced, and transformed it. In many cases, they remained haunted by phenomenology, either as a subterranean foundation or as a necessary adversary.
Let’s unfold the historical and conceptual arc.
1. Structuralism: From Subject to Structure
Structuralism, arising in the 1950s–60s (Lévi-Strauss, Lacan, Barthes, early Foucault), aimed to displace the phenomenological subject with anonymous structures:
- It rejected the primacy of lived experience (phenomenology) in favor of systems of signs, kinship, myth, or language.
- The subject becomes a function of structure, not a source of meaning.
- Lacan famously declared, “The unconscious is structured like a language”—a direct counter to phenomenology’s idea of the subject as intentional consciousness.
This was a dramatic break from Husserl’s and even Merleau-Ponty’s vision of meaning emerging through subjective synthesis. Structuralists considered this a form of idealism or subjectivism.
Yet even so…
Structuralism was often built on top of phenomenology.
For instance, Merleau-Ponty’s late work on language, perception, and the “flesh” influenced both Foucault and Derrida. Lacan’s early seminars engaged deeply with Sartre’s The Imaginary, and Barthes’s “death of the author” was aimed at a phenomenological reading of authorship.
2. Poststructuralism: The Return of the Ghost
Poststructuralism (Derrida, Deleuze, Foucault’s later work, Kristeva, Nancy, etc.) was not merely an extension of structuralism—it was often a critique of structuralism’s rigidity, its ahistoricism, and its failure to account for difference, desire, singularity, and temporality.
Key features:
- Derrida: While deconstructing phenomenology (especially Husserl), Derrida remained in dialogue with it. His early work (Speech and Phenomena, Voice and Phenomenon) is a sustained immanent critique. He calls it a “hauntology”—phenomenology is never quite there, but never absent.
- Deleuze: Resisted phenomenology’s reliance on intentionality, but still affirmed the immanence of experience—especially through Bergson and Spinoza. His work on affect (with Guattari) could be read as a non-phenomenological phenomenology—a thinking of lived multiplicity without subject.
- Foucault: Early work (like Madness and Civilization) carries phenomenological traces—especially Binswanger and Merleau-Ponty—but he moves toward genealogy, discourse, and power, leaving behind the constituting subject.
So, in poststructuralism:
Phenomenology is no longer foundational, but it is never fully absent. It becomes a site of contestation, transformation, and spectral return.
3. The “End of the Subject” – or Its Rebirth in New Forms?
Poststructuralists often announced the “death of the subject”, which was a critique of:
- the transcendental ego of Husserl,
- the existential subject of Sartre,
- and even the embodied subject of Merleau-Ponty.
But in doing so, they often created new concepts of subjectivity:
- Derrida’s “subjectile” or haunted subject
- Deleuze’s “dividuals” or “larval subjects”
- Foucault’s “subjectivation” within power
None of these reject experience, but they displace phenomenology’s privileged first-person stance. The “subject” now emerges within language, assemblages, power relations, and affective intensities.
4. The Return of Phenomenology in Post-Poststructuralism?
From the 1990s onward, phenomenology re-enters continental philosophy through new routes:
- Jean-Luc Marion, Michel Henry, Jean-Luc Nancy, and Renaud Barbaras return to phenomenology with new depth (e.g., saturated phenomena, affective immanence).
- Even Judith Butler’s work on performativity (though Foucauldian) engages Merleau-Ponty’s ideas on embodiment.
- New phenomenology emerges in critical race theory, feminist thought, and affect theory (e.g., Sara Ahmed, Alia Al-Saji).
Conclusion: They Did Not Leave It Behind—They Transfigured It
So, to your question:
Did continental philosophers from structuralism onward successfully leave phenomenology behind?
No—they transformed it, contested it, decentered it, and haunted it.
Phenomenology became:
- The shadow they had to wrestle with,
- The ground they often denied while standing upon,
- And, eventually, a resource for poststructural and posthuman thought—especially in theories of affect, embodiment, and trauma.
Would you like a diagram or timeline mapping these philosophical currents and their relation to phenomenology?