Excellent question, my friend. Mencius (孟子) dealt with the question of human evil (性惡) not by denying its existence, but by reframing it: for Mencius, evil is not inherent in human nature (性), but rather arises from the failure to cultivate our inherent moral tendencies. In contrast to Xunzi (荀子), who famously argued that human nature is evil (性惡), Mencius maintained that human nature is good (性善), but that this goodness is incipient, fragile, and requires nurturing.
Let’s break this down into Mencius’ key responses to the reality of human wrongdoing:
1.
The Sprouts (端, duān): Human Nature as Proto-Moral Potential
- Mencius identifies four beginnings (or “sprouts”) of virtue:
- Compassion → Ren (仁)
- Shame → Yi (義)
- Respect → Li (禮)
- Discernment → Zhi (智)
These are not full-fledged virtues, but affective and cognitive tendencies embedded in human nature.
Evil arises not because these are absent, but because they are neglected, obstructed, or undeveloped.
So for Mencius, a cruel or selfish person is not proof of an evil nature—it’s a sign that the sprouts have withered, or were never nurtured by the proper environment (家庭、教育、禮樂).
2.
The Role of Environment and Cultivation
- Mencius places great emphasis on ritual (禮), family, and education to nurture and develop the moral sprouts.
- Just as a seedling can fail without water and sunlight, so too can the good nature fail without ethical cultivation.
Thus, evil is not “natural” in essence, but natural in occurrence when one’s conditions are inadequate.
This is a proto-ecological model of ethics: human virtue or vice is not only internal, but relationally and environmentally emergent.
3.
The Problem of Habit and Deformation
- Mencius acknowledges that people do evil things—often habitually. But this is due to:
- Bad habits
- Social corruption
- Loss of reflection
- Starvation of one’s ethical sensibilities
In Mencius 6A:8, he writes:
“The heart of compassion is possessed by all men… If it were not so, how could we call them human?”
So even the tyrant, the criminal, the apathetic—they still have the sprouts, but they are buried under the sediment of desensitization and distortion.
4.
The Return (反身): Moral Effort as Recovery
- Mencius does not romanticize goodness—he stresses the importance of effort (力行), self-reflection (反身), and moral labor.
- The idea is that one must return to one’s nature, not fabricate virtue from scratch.
This return (反) resonates with both Confucian and Daoist traditions: it is the path back to one’s own vitality, one’s own source.
5.
Contrast with Xunzi: Two Visions of Moral Formation
|
|
Mencius (性善） |
Xunzi (性惡） |
|
Human nature |
Good, with moral potential |
Evil, selfish, chaotic |
|
Evil |
Deformation of goodness |
Natural instinct |
|
Solution |
Cultivation of sprouts |
Imposition of order through ritual and law |
|
Educator’s role |
Gardener (nurture) |
Carver or potter (reshape) |
Mencius sees moral development as organic, while Xunzi sees it as corrective and imposed.
In Summary
Mencius deals with 性惡 by:
- Affirming that evil arises from the failure to develop our good nature, not from the essence of that nature.
- Emphasizing the need for ritual, familial warmth, and reflective practice to awaken the dormant good.
- Maintaining that even evil people retain the potential for moral renewal.
For Mencius, to become human is not to erase evil, but to return to the place where goodness still stirs beneath the ash.
Would you like a fictional dialogue between Mencius and Xunzi on this theme?