包子的邏輯很簡單，有權力就有屌，有屌就可以惡搞中國人民，包括國民黨，
I would say:
Xi is certainly bothered by China’s economic slowdown —
but probably not in the same way that Western observers imagine.
The key difference is this:
For many Western leaders,
economic growth is the foundation of political legitimacy.
For Xi,
economic growth is important,
but regime security, historical control, and political centralization appear even more important.
That changes everything.
1. Xi does not think like a normal developmental technocrat anymore
Earlier CCP leaders — especially after Deng Xiaoping — largely operated under a tacit bargain:
“We deliver prosperity,
you tolerate authoritarian rule.”
That was the post-1978 social contract.
Xi seems to have partially revised that contract into something more like:
“Security, national rejuvenation, Party control, and civilizational struggle come first —
even at significant economic cost.”
This is why under Xi we have seen:
- tech crackdowns,
- property-sector deleveraging,
- ideological tightening,
- anti-corruption purges,
- pressure on private capital,
- tighter internet control,
- expansion of state-owned influence,
- and heavy emphasis on “self-reliance.”
From a purely GDP-maximization perspective,
many of these policies look self-damaging.
But Xi may not be optimizing for GDP alone.
He appears to be optimizing for:
- regime durability,
- strategic autonomy,
- political obedience,
- and wartime resilience.
2. Xi probably sees “economic pain” as survivable — but political chaos as fatal
This is crucial.
The CCP’s deepest historical trauma is not low growth.
It is:
- dynastic collapse,
- Soviet collapse,
- factional fragmentation,
- ideological decay,
- mass instability.
Xi has repeatedly invoked the fall of the Soviet Union as a warning example.
His famous remark about the USSR was essentially:
nobody was “man enough” to defend the Party.
That tells you a lot.
In Xi’s worldview:
|
Threat |
Severity |
|
Slower growth |
painful |
|
Youth unemployment |
dangerous |
|
Property crisis |
manageable |
|
Loss of Party control |
existential |
So yes —
he likely worries about the economy.
But he may fear:
political liberalization,
elite fragmentation,
or systemic loss of control
far more.
3. Xi may believe China is entering a “long struggle period”
This is another important shift.
The older CCP model assumed:
- globalization,
- export integration,
- technology transfer,
- peaceful rise.
Xi increasingly speaks as if:
China is entering an era of:
- containment,
- technological blockade,
- geopolitical confrontation,
- and prolonged strategic competition with the U.S.
That mindset changes economic priorities.
For example:
A Western economist may ask:
“Why damage the private sector?”
Xi may instead ask:
“Can this sector survive sanctions or war?”
Or:
“Can this billionaire become politically autonomous?”
Different optimization function.
4. Xi probably believes the Chinese state can absorb much more suffering than Western systems can
This is one of the most underestimated factors.
Beijing likely believes China possesses:
- stronger state capacity,
- tighter social control,
- deeper civilizational cohesion,
- greater hardship tolerance,
- and longer strategic patience.
In other words,
Xi may believe:
democracies panic faster than centralized systems.
This belief shapes:
- Taiwan calculations,
- trade strategy,
- sanctions resistance,
- and industrial policy.
Whether this belief is correct is another question.
5. But there are signs Xi
is
worried
If Xi truly did not care about the economy at all,
we would not see:
- repeated stimulus measures,
- efforts to stabilize housing,
- concern about youth employment,
- outreach to entrepreneurs,
- support for manufacturing upgrades,
- pressure on local governments,
- or attempts to stabilize foreign investment.
The CCP absolutely understands that:
economic legitimacy still matters.
The problem is:
China’s old growth model may no longer work easily.
Especially with:
- aging demographics,
- debt,
- property overbuild,
- capital flight pressure,
- U.S. tech restrictions,
- and global supply-chain diversification.
So Beijing is trying to transition:
from “high-speed growth”
to something like:
controlled strategic endurance.
6. The deeper issue may be that Xi sees history itself changing
This is where the discussion becomes philosophical.
Xi often speaks less like a conventional economist,
and more like someone who believes:
China is living through a civilizational turning point.
His language repeatedly invokes:
- rejuvenation,
- humiliation,
- struggle,
- destiny,
- historical inevitability,
- national spirit.
Which suggests he may interpret present economic pain as:
the acceptable cost of surviving a larger historical confrontation.
Almost like wartime mobilization psychology —
even before actual war.
So can we say Xi is “not bothered at all”?
I would say:
No.
He is almost certainly bothered.
But:
he seems willing to tolerate far more economic pain than many outsiders expect —
if he believes it strengthens:
- Party control,
- strategic resilience,
- and China’s long-term historical position.
Or put differently:
Many observers think Xi’s primary question is:
“How do we maximize growth?”
But his actual question may be closer to:
“How does a civilization-state survive a century of confrontation?”
