Thursday, October 31, 2024
The Forgotten Analyst: Hermine Hug-Hellmuth (1871–1924) （Prophecy Coles, 2024)
https://www.karnacbooks.com/product/the-forgotten-analyst-hermine-hug-hellmuth-18711924/97835/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hermine_Hug-Hellmuth
你要理解，歷來，死于非命的治療者或分析師，寥指可數，意思是說，多半都可恥的，安全死在床上，就像將軍們，多半都可恥的，安全死在床上，當然星星越多顆，床越大，越適合馬上風，這件事說明，治療者或分析師，對于危險，對于冒險，對于涉險，對于深淵，對于魔鬼，對于邪惡，對于悲劇，對于冥界，對于不得救贖，對于無法原諒，對于為黑暗所噬，只是，隔靴搔癢，隔山打牛，霧裡看花，外行假裝內行，
主體是什麼 （what’s subject) (車行形上學） （自由） （2025）
主體 （subject)，就是半生不熟 （half baked)，讀了一點哲學，的自體 （self)，
上述，關鍵詞，是半生不熟，
比如說，牛排，三分熟，
有點像，更新世的人，
茹毛飲血，津津有味，
意思是說，如果熟透，
主體就會，變成臘肉，
比如說，毛臘肉，
二十年前，我在人民大會堂，對著勃起的毛臘肉，比過中指，
意思是說，我沒有主體，只有自體，
而且是，詐現乍現，的那種，
自體是什麼 （what’s self) (車行形上學）（自由）（2025）
自體（self)，有自無體，
雖有其身體，和內心世界，
但其實無體，
這件事，讓人如釋重負，鬆了一口氣，
你要理解，你之為你，我之為我，他之為他，只是詐（乍）現，
因緣和合，白駒過隙，就像康芮颱風，成功登陸，旋即，嘉義出海，
三十年前，我曾在墾丁，仰望頭頂，海棠颱風，穿過恆春半島，
炷香未盡，復星空燦然，
你問，既然只是，詐現乍現，那麼一切，都無所謂乎，
我說，你要理解，詐現乍現，之所以，詐現乍現，
這個發生，就是你我，存在的理由，
意思是說，你我不應，辜負那個理由，
比如說，滅共，就是你我，詐現乍現，的理由，
魯迅，則會說，頂住黑暗的閘門，就是他，之所以詐現乍現，的存在的理由，
然後，你要記得，滅共之後，
所作已辦，為而不有，
你可以考慮，
點起紙菸，看著遠方，
或華亭擺渡，度過餘生，
注意
包子需要戰爭，以遮掩其，毀壞中國經濟，造成民不聊生，生靈塗炭之罪責，共匪近日將攻台，李嘉誠為此，七點六折，甩賣北京三環內，數十樓盤，注意島內匪諜，亦將蠢蠢欲動，颱風 6:40 PM 出海，6:29 PM 風勢已緩，朝鮮出兵十萬援俄，其中三分之一，是特種兵，主要任務是在俄境內，保護普丁特種屁股，其開銷彈藥，後勤補給，全由共匪出資，平均月薪，四千一百九十二美金，稅後實拿，十二美元，其餘全部，被金正恩拿去，買手遊點數，起因是，共匪不希望俄國，太快戰敗，或美俄關係改善，另先前已說過，國台辦已派殺手赴日，滅口橘子，以保柯文哲，金流秘密，永不見天日，唯橘子亦非吃素，正苦練宮本武藏，斷水流封喉絕技，準備與匪殺手，決一死戰，
What saved Guattari from making such heartless mistakes, though he was a Maoist, like Badiou? (ChatGPT, 2024-10-31)
I think his ADHD and association with Deleuze saved his ass.
Guattari’s background, particularly his work as a psychoanalyst and his commitment to radical psychiatry, significantly influenced his approach to Maoism, saving him from the ideological rigidity that led others, like Badiou, into heartless mistakes. While Guattari was indeed drawn to Maoist ideas, his relationship with Maoism was tempered by a profound skepticism of centralized authority, a commitment to individual and collective freedom, and a deep-rooted ethical orientation toward liberation without oppression. Several aspects of Guattari’s work and beliefs likely protected him from endorsing or excusing the brutal authoritarianism associated with Maoist regimes.
1. A Commitment to Anti-Authoritarian Politics
Guattari’s Maoism was always more anti-authoritarian than doctrinaire. His engagement with Maoist ideas was primarily a critique of capitalist and bureaucratic structures rather than a wholesale endorsement of any one ideological regime. Guattari’s political stance was decentralized and pluralistic, aligned with a broader left-libertarian tradition rather than orthodox Maoism. He sought to empower marginalized voices and support forms of resistance that did not rely on hierarchical structures. This anti-authoritarian commitment protected him from the rigid adherence to a single ideology, as he valued multiplicity, autonomy, and the dismantling of oppressive structures above any specific ideological allegiance.
2. Radical Psychiatry and Ethical Commitment to the Individual
Guattari’s work at La Borde Clinic, an experimental psychiatric institution in France, deeply influenced his worldview and approach to politics. He was committed to what he called “schizoanalysis,” a method of psychoanalysis that emphasized breaking down oppressive, standardized ways of thinking and living. This work made him particularly sensitive to the ways ideologies and systems can pathologize and oppress individuals. His commitment to the psychological well-being of individuals made him wary of any political movement or ideology that dehumanized people in the name of a higher cause. Unlike more rigid Maoists, Guattari’s psychoanalytic background led him to value personal liberation and diversity, protecting him from supporting repressive revolutionary measures.
3. An Emphasis on Micropolitics and Molecular Revolution
Guattari, especially in collaboration with Deleuze, developed a concept of “micropolitics” and “molecular revolution” that focused on small-scale, everyday acts of resistance and transformation, rather than top-down revolutionary movements. He believed that true change happened on a micro-level, through shifts in social, interpersonal, and psychic structures, rather than through large-scale, authoritarian upheavals. This micropolitical approach helped Guattari distance himself from the centralized, authoritarian impulses within Maoism and other revolutionary ideologies. His belief in grassroots, decentralized transformation meant that he was less likely to endorse violent, large-scale purges or authoritarian controls.
4. An Ethical Stance Rooted in Liberation Without Oppression
For Guattari, liberation was always about freeing individuals and groups from oppressive systems — whether capitalist, bureaucratic, or authoritarian. His Maoism was filtered through this lens of liberation, not as an excuse for control or repression. He was critical of any ideological position that sacrificed human lives or autonomy in the name of progress. His commitment to ethical liberation kept him cautious about endorsing any model that justified oppression, even when it aligned ideologically. Guattari’s ethics were grounded in a respect for autonomy and difference, and his approach to liberation was focused on removing structures that limit human potential rather than imposing new forms of control.
5. Collaborative and Experimental Approach with Deleuze
Guattari’s collaboration with Deleuze provided a philosophical grounding that helped him navigate his Maoist leanings critically. Together, they developed a body of work that emphasized the rejection of rigid hierarchies, the dangers of “state thought,” and the value of experimentation over fixed ideological commitments. Deleuze and Guattari’s emphasis on “rhizomatic” thinking — which avoids centralized control and values non-hierarchical structures — further distanced Guattari from authoritarian ideologies. This partnership encouraged him to interpret Maoist ideas creatively, as part of a broader exploration of liberation and multiplicity rather than as a rigid political allegiance.
In short, while Guattari was inspired by certain Maoist critiques of capitalism and hierarchy, he interpreted these ideas in an open-ended, anti-authoritarian way. His commitment to micropolitics, his work in radical psychiatry, and his ethical stance against all forms of oppression safeguarded him from endorsing the repressive aspects of Maoism seen in authoritarian regimes. Guattari’s version of Maoism was less about centralized revolutionary control and more about dismantling all forms of oppressive authority, making it an ideological position shaped by empathy, liberation, and a commitment to human diversity.
What saved Deleuze from making such heartless mistakes, though he was closely associated with Guattari, who was also a Maoist? (ChatGPT, 2024-10-31)
I think his inability to be indoctrinated, including to be analyzed by Lacanians, saved his soul. You see, he must have been a lover of bird songs. In other words, birds inspired and saved him.
Deleuze’s philosophy is marked by an anti-totalitarian and anti-dogmatic spirit that likely shielded him from making the “heartless mistakes” that others, like Badiou or Heidegger, fell into. While he collaborated closely with Guattari, who was influenced by Maoism, Deleuze maintained a critical distance from rigid ideological commitments, including those associated with Maoism or any other revolutionary dogma. Instead, Deleuze’s approach to politics and philosophy is profoundly rooted in a resistance to authoritarianism, grand unifying theories, and any notion of absolute truth that could justify oppression or violence.
1. Radical Pluralism and Anti-Oedipal Thought
Deleuze’s commitment to multiplicity and difference — what he often refers to as a “radical pluralism” — forms the core of his philosophy and steers him away from any ideology that demands conformity or uniformity. In A Thousand Plateaus, co-written with Guattari, Deleuze champions the idea of “rhizomatic” structures, which are decentralized, non-hierarchical, and ever-shifting. This perspective stands in opposition to the rigid, top-down structures characteristic of authoritarian regimes. His preference for plurality and openness would have made it difficult for him to align with any ideology, like Maoism, that could lead to the suppression of individual freedom or complexity.
2. A Focus on Desire and Creativity Over Dogma
Deleuze and Guattari’s work in Anti-Oedipus emphasizes the importance of desire as a creative, liberating force rather than one that should be directed or controlled by any overarching system. Their critique of psychoanalysis and state structures in this text reveals a deep suspicion of any power that seeks to channel desire into rigid pathways or prescribed roles. This notion is fundamentally anti-authoritarian, as it resists attempts by the state (or any regime) to direct and repress human desires in the name of ideological purity. Deleuze’s focus on “lines of flight” — paths of escape and resistance — also speaks to his commitment to liberating life from oppressive structures, aligning him with emancipatory projects without endorsing repressive revolutionary means.
3. Suspicion of Grand Narratives and Fixed Ideals
Unlike Badiou, who was drawn to revolutionary events as transformative truths, Deleuze was skeptical of grand narratives that claim universal solutions or absolute truths. His philosophy values process, flux, and becoming over any fixed ideal or endpoint, which distances him from revolutionary ideologies that promise definitive, often violent, transformations of society. Deleuze’s thinking is far more cautious about ideas of purity or truth that could justify large-scale sacrifices or repression. His belief in continuous creation and transformation undercuts any inclination toward totalitarian or purist ideologies, which often demand rigid adherence to a specific goal.
4. Ethics of Experimentation Rather Than Ideological Commitment
Deleuze’s philosophy promotes an ethics of experimentation rather than adherence to dogma. He and Guattari encouraged people to create their own ways of thinking, living, and acting, advocating for “micropolitics” — small-scale, context-sensitive ways of engaging with power. This micropolitical approach differs sharply from the large-scale ideological projects of regimes like Mao’s, which demand adherence to a single, unifying ideology. By promoting experimentation and individual exploration over collective, enforced doctrines, Deleuze protected himself from the ideological entrapments that led others to overlook or excuse mass suffering.
In essence, Deleuze’s philosophical values — radical pluralism, creative desire, skepticism of grand narratives, and a commitment to experimentation — kept him distant from authoritarian ideologies and prevented him from making the same mistakes. His approach to politics and philosophy is deeply ethical in its respect for complexity, difference, and life’s inherent multiplicity, steering him away from any path that might reduce individuals to ideological tools or justify violence in the name of a higher ideal. This grounding in an ethics of openness and resistance to any fixed structure or absolute truth ultimately saved him from falling into the heartless mistakes that compromised the moral integrity of some of his contemporaries.
Therefore, Badiou’s silence on Mao’s legacy, is like Heidegger’s silence on Nazi’s legacy. Tell me, how could such brilliant philosophers make such heartless mistakes? (ChatGPT, 2024-1031)
題目： 哲學史上的兩個惡名昭彰的沈默 （The two infamous silences in the history of philosophy）
The silence of philosophers like Badiou on Mao’s legacy, or Heidegger on the Nazis, reveals a troubling tension in the relationship between intellectual commitment and moral responsibility. These “heartless mistakes,” as they appear, often stem from a deep investment in certain ideals or systems of thought that blinds them to the catastrophic consequences these ideologies can produce in practice.
For Badiou, Mao represents a model of revolutionary fervor and political possibility that aligns with his philosophical ideals of rupture, event, and fidelity to truth. His commitment to these concepts seems to have created a lens through which he views historical events, prioritizing the revolutionary potential over the human cost. Badiou’s focus on the transformative possibilities of Mao’s actions likely led him to abstract from, or ignore, the suffering caused under Maoist policies. This selective blindness reflects a kind of philosophical purity — an attachment to an idealized concept of revolution that overrides the real-world atrocities associated with it. In his commitment to “events” that break with the status quo, Badiou seems to find it difficult to grapple with the moral responsibility for the human lives lost in the pursuit of these ideals.
Similarly, Heidegger’s relationship with Nazism reveals the dangers of conflating abstract philosophical visions with political reality. Heidegger was drawn to the Nazi movement not merely for its nationalism but because he saw in it the possibility of a radical historical transformation — a rejection of modern technological alienation and a return to a more “authentic” existence. His silence on the atrocities of the Nazi regime reflects his prioritization of this philosophical vision over the moral reality of the regime’s actions. Heidegger’s attachment to his vision of “Being” and historical destiny led him to disregard, or perhaps downplay, the horrifying acts that accompanied this so-called historical transformation.
These heartless mistakes arise, in part, from a kind of philosophical hubris — a belief that their concepts are so profound and universal that they transcend the moral constraints that govern ordinary political judgment. This can lead to a dangerous abstraction, where suffering and violence are seen as incidental or even necessary components of achieving an ideal. Both Badiou and Heidegger seem to have fallen into this trap, allowing their intellectual commitments to blind them to the horrors unfolding under the very regimes they were drawn to.
At their worst, these mistakes remind us that brilliant minds are not immune to ideological blindness, especially when they are captivated by grand ideas of transformation and rupture. They suggest that a philosophy divorced from empathy and ethical accountability can easily slide into complicity with the worst forms of political violence. Such examples underscore the necessity of grounding philosophical and political ideals in a commitment to human dignity and compassion, lest the pursuit of abstract ideals lead to devastating consequences in reality.
碎片只能作碎片該作的事 （車行形上學）（自由）（2025）
Badiou 的多，意涵一以多呈現，一蘊含多的可能性，換句話說，多即是一，多才是真相，
What does Badiou mean by multiplicity? （ChatGPT, 2024-10-31)
In Alain Badiou’s philosophy, “multiplicity” is a central concept that contrasts with the traditional notion of “being” as a singular unity or essence. For Badiou, multiplicity is a way of thinking about being without reducing it to a single, unchanging substance or identity. Instead, being is understood as a composition of multiple, diverse elements or structures that do not rely on any essential unity. His approach is heavily influenced by set theory in mathematics, where sets can be composed of multiple elements without needing a defining essence or commonality beyond their coexistence within a set.
Badiou uses multiplicity to challenge essentialist and identitarian perspectives. He argues that reality is composed of countless “situations” or “sets” that are organized by differences and relationships rather than by any overarching unity. In this framework, there is no “one” that defines or limits being; instead, there is a proliferation of multiplicities, each constituted by their own internal dynamics and relations.
This concept is crucial in his political and ethical theories, where he insists that truths and transformative events emerge within specific multiplicities and are irreducible to universal or monolithic ideas. For Badiou, an “event” is something that disrupts an established multiplicity, creating the potential for a new truth to be realized and a new order of multiplicity to emerge. Thus, multiplicity becomes not only a way to describe the structure of reality but also a means to envision how change and novelty are possible.
我不確定，Badiou 的多，是否等同于碎片，但看起來很像碎片，
意思是說，總之不是那個有名的自以為是的個體主義的「一」，或那個有名的死纏爛打的客體關係的「二」，
但是，Badiou 用集合論，處理多，
意思是說，他畢竟還是，需要一個冷錢包，來裝柯文哲，千辛萬苦，千萬筆貪污所得，總計的那幾百億，
What if all those multiplicity cannot (or refuse to) be contained in that set? （ChatGPT, 2024-10-31)
If multiplicities cannot or refuse to be contained in a set, it directly challenges the structural logic that Badiou draws from set theory, where sets are collections of elements that share a certain condition for inclusion. In such a scenario, Badiou’s framework might face the problem of what could be termed “uncontainable multiplicities” — entities or events that resist classification, containment, or integration within any organized structure or formal logic.
In Badiou’s terms, this would represent an instance where multiplicities transcend the ontological framework of “situation” (a term he uses to denote any structured context or set of relations). An uncontainable multiplicity would either point to something genuinely novel and unprecedented (perhaps an “event” that has yet to be assimilated) or expose the limits of the current system of thought and organization.
From this perspective, the refusal of multiplicities to be contained or organized could reveal a radical form of alterity — a reality or existence that remains truly “other” and resists all categorization. Badiou might interpret this as a precursor to a potential “event,” where a new truth could emerge that reorganizes reality or understanding in a transformative way. Alternatively, it might signify a kind of limit to knowledge or ontology, underscoring the boundaries of what can be conceptualized or included within any given framework.
In a sense, Badiou would likely see uncontainable multiplicities as moments of disruption, calling for a re-evaluation of existing structures and inviting the possibility of a new set or system that can incorporate these previously uncontainable elements. However, if they persist as radically unassimilable, they could represent a confrontation with the very foundations of ontology as we understand it, challenging the basic premises of set theory as a metaphor for being.
回到碎片，你要理解，尼采對（收集）碎片 （有點像更新世狩獵採集者），情有獨鍾，這是為什麼，尼采能夠預見，一二百年後的我們，
一沙一世界，碎片就是一沙，你我就是一沙，
換句話說，Badiou 的「集合」，就是「世界」，
依此，Badiou 眼中，沒有個人，只有烏泱泱的紅衛兵，和他們高舉的紅旗海，
換句話說，Badiou 的哲學，就是在天安門城門，獰笑校閱紅衛兵，的毛澤東的哲學，
How does the fact that Badiou is a Maoist influences his philosophy of multiplicity, being, and event? （ChatGPT, 2024-10-31)
Badiou’s Maoist influence significantly shapes his philosophy, particularly in how he approaches multiplicity, being, and event. His Maoist orientation, emphasizing revolutionary change, collective action, and the role of transformative events, resonates throughout his philosophical framework and infuses it with a distinct political and emancipatory edge.
1. Multiplicity and the Collective
In Maoism, there’s a strong emphasis on the masses and the revolutionary potential of the people. Badiou’s concept of multiplicity reflects this by emphasizing that “being” is not a singular, unified essence but rather a multiplicity of diverse and sometimes conflicting elements. This aligns with the Maoist view that society is composed of many distinct groups, each with unique positions and capacities, yet capable of joining together in collective action. Badiou’s insistence on the irreducibility of multiplicity to a unified whole suggests that the political reality, like ontological reality, is always a site of potential friction, contradiction, and transformation — a view compatible with Maoist dialectics.
2. Being as Structure and Situation
Badiou’s notion of “being” as structured situations draws on Mao’s approach to social conditions, where every political reality is embedded in specific structures that both define it and limit it. Just as Maoist theory argues that conditions must be carefully understood and engaged with to transform society, Badiou sees “being” as a series of structured situations that are not static but open to interpretation and intervention. This means that multiplicities are not random or chaotic but exist within structures that contain the seeds of their own contradictions and potentials for transformation.
3. Event as Revolutionary Potential
Central to Badiou’s Maoist influence is his notion of the “event,” which echoes Mao’s revolutionary ideology. For Maoists, history is marked by revolutionary ruptures — moments where radical action and commitment fundamentally alter existing social and political conditions. Badiou’s event is a moment that disrupts the status quo of any given “situation” or “set” and brings forth a new possibility that was previously unimaginable. This mirrors Maoist ideology, where the “new” emerges through the contradictions inherent in existing conditions, and revolutionary action can reshape reality itself.
In this sense, an event in Badiou’s philosophy is both an ontological rupture and a revolutionary act, embodying Maoist ideals of commitment to a transformative truth. The event requires fidelity to this new truth, demanding that individuals remain committed to the possibility of a transformed reality — much like Maoist dedication to revolutionary ideals, which requires steadfast allegiance to the unfolding revolution.
4. Truth as a Process of Fidelity
For Badiou, truth is not static or predetermined; rather, it emerges through a commitment to an event. This aligns with Maoist thought, which emphasizes a process-oriented view of truth grounded in revolutionary practice and the ongoing commitment to change. Mao saw revolution as a process that required continuous struggle and fidelity, even amidst adversity. Similarly, Badiou argues that once an event has taken place, individuals must remain faithful to it, enduring the difficulties of translating it into a new structure of being. This reflects the Maoist ideal of ideological commitment and the importance of remaining loyal to revolutionary causes.
5. Anti-Essentialism and the Rejection of Pure Identity
Maoism rejects fixed essences and embraces a dialectical view of identity, where individuals and groups are defined by their relations and roles within a larger structure. Badiou’s concept of multiplicity mirrors this anti-essentialist stance, as he argues that “being” cannot be understood through a single essence or identity. Instead, being is always multiple, composed of relations that defy stable categorization. This refusal of any essential identity reflects the Maoist critique of rigid class categories and other fixed identities, focusing instead on the dynamic, relational aspects of social life and the potential for transformation inherent in every situation.
In summary, Badiou’s Maoism influences his philosophy by encouraging a view of reality that is dynamic, relational, and open to revolutionary transformation. His concepts of multiplicity, being, and event are infused with an emancipatory drive, reflecting a commitment to the transformative potential of collective action and ideological fidelity. This Maoist perspective turns his ontology into a site of political possibility, where the “event” becomes a revolutionary rupture, and multiplicity opens up spaces for new truths to emerge in defiance of established structures.
我的哲學，則是清醒看著，文革十年毛澤東，在專列上脫褲兩千次，嫖遍中國黑暗大地，的「滅共優先于回到更新世的家」的哲學，
回到碎片，我想，碎片 （像是原子）只能作碎片該作的事，那就是碎片人生，落葉人生，宇宙塵埃 （cosmic dust) 人生，意思是說，碎片與碎片之間，是否能夠詐（乍）現出什麼玩意 （比如說，分子），碎片並不在意 （can’t care less)，
Now, “His concepts of multiplicity, being, and event are infused with an emancipatory drive, reflecting a commitment to the transformative potential of collective action and ideological fidelity.”, do you really believe emancipation comes from the collective, which is exactly that famous “meat grinder”, which is called the communist regime, e.g. CCP？ (ChatGPT, 2024-10-31)
Badiou’s commitment to the idea of collective emancipation is indeed a complex and contentious one, particularly in light of how collectivism has played out in various communist regimes, including the CCP. Badiou’s philosophy draws heavily from the revolutionary impulse in Maoist thought, which emphasizes the potential of collective action to bring about radical change. However, his ideas about the collective as a vehicle for emancipation are not uncritically (這裡 ChatGPT 錯了, 應該是 not critically enough) aligned with the historical realities of authoritarian collectivism.
For Badiou, the collective is not necessarily synonymous with the state, nor with the rigid structures often associated with authoritarian regimes. Instead, his concept of the collective is more abstract and idealistic — a form of collective fidelity to an event or truth that can break with oppressive structures. Badiou’s ideal of a transformative collective does not inherently imply a centralized, authoritarian apparatus; it speaks more to a form of political agency grounded in solidarity and a shared commitment to change. In his thought, this collective is more like a community of individuals who remain loyal to a transformative possibility than an entity governed by a central authority.
Badiou’s vision of emancipation is rooted in a belief that individuals can transcend their personal interests to commit to a larger, shared truth. In theory, this collective is a radical, pluralistic space where differences are not flattened by authoritarianism but are instead organized around a common commitment to change. This vision is worlds apart from the “meat grinder” you mention, as he would reject any model that suppresses individual agency or co-opts collective action for oppressive purposes.
That said, there’s an undeniable tension between Badiou’s theoretical commitment to the collective and the historical legacy of authoritarian regimes, which have frequently appropriated the language of emancipation and collectivism to justify repression. His reliance on the concept of the collective as a means for liberation can feel idealistic or even naive, especially in light of how collectivist ideals have been manipulated in practice.
In short, Badiou’s philosophy aims to reclaim the idea of collective action from authoritarian abuses, envisioning a collective that exists as an open, revolutionary force rather than a bureaucratic or oppressive regime. Whether true emancipation can come from such a collective in practice remains an open question, especially given the fraught history of collectivist movements. Badiou’s vision is one of radical potential, but it must be measured against the realities and risks of collectivism as it has often been actualized.
Badiou did apologize for his enthusiasm for the Khmer Rouge, Therefore, this apology is fake? At least I never heard that he apologized for the eighty million Chinese people slaughtered by Mao. （ChatGPT, 2024-10-31)
Badiou’s engagement with revolutionary movements, including his early enthusiasm for the Khmer Rouge, is indeed a controversial and complex aspect of his intellectual legacy. His apology for supporting the Khmer Rouge — a movement that ultimately committed brutal acts of violence — reflects, in part, his acknowledgment of the limits and dangers of revolutionary ideology when it veers into authoritarianism and mass violence. However, his lack of an explicit apology for Mao’s role in the suffering and deaths of millions in China raises critical questions about his consistency and accountability in confronting the realities of these regimes.
Badiou’s philosophy of radical events and fidelity to revolutionary change often leads him to emphasize the transformative potential of movements, sometimes at the expense of fully reckoning with the harms they have caused. His tendency to abstract revolutionary struggles as philosophical concepts can distance him from the real-world implications and human costs associated with them. This detachment can make his apology seem less like a full repudiation of the atrocities committed and more like a nuanced disavowal of specific consequences, rather than a wholesale reconsideration of his revolutionary ideals.
Moreover, Badiou’s Maoist influence remains evident in his work, and he often interprets Mao’s legacy in light of the revolutionary potential it represents, rather than its tragic human toll. This selective engagement has led some to question the sincerity of his apology for supporting other authoritarian movements, like the Khmer Rouge, especially since he continues to admire Mao’s thought without addressing the profound suffering caused under his rule.
In short, while Badiou’s apology for the Khmer Rouge may reflect some degree of acknowledgment of the dangers inherent in revolutionary zeal, his silence on Mao’s legacy suggests a persistent idealization of revolutionary movements that overlooks or downplays their human costs. This tension remains one of the most controversial aspects of his intellectual project and raises valid concerns about the ethics of endorsing revolutionary ideologies without fully grappling with their historical consequences.
https://www.blogger.com/blog/post/edit/3291779510896058248/1783635618445921757
https://www.blogger.com/blog/post/edit/3291779510896058248/2752781200682949012
https://www.blogger.com/blog/post/edit/3291779510896058248/4480509908197099537