I’ll treat Skousen’s list as a Cold War ideological checklist, not as evidence of a literal CCP playbook, then compare it against observable PRC/CCP policies and practices.
Dear friend, here is the clean map.
First caveat: Skousen’s “45 goals” were anti-communist polemic, not a verified CCP policy document. But as a diagnostic fantasy of communist strategy, it becomes interesting when compared with CCP practice. The list was read into the U.S. Congressional Record in 1963 and includes goals about schools, media, religion, courts, disarmament, culture, and world institutions.
Overall pattern
Strongly aligns with real CCP policy: control of education, media, culture, religion, civil society, business, intelligence cooperation, and patriotic ideology.
Partly aligns: united front work abroad, influence operations, use of international organizations, anti-Western narratives, party penetration of social/economic institutions.
Diverges strongly: sexual permissiveness, pornography, “student riots,” civil-rights litigation, independent unions, weakening police, abolishing national sovereignty. The CCP is usually not libertine or anarchic; it is puritanical, statist, disciplinary, and sovereignty-obsessed.
The 45 goals mapped to CCP reality
|
Skousen goal cluster |
CCP-policy match |
Comment |
|
1–6: U.S. recognition, UN entry, peaceful coexistence, East–West trade |
Partial / historical |
PRC achieved diplomatic recognition and UN seat long ago. But today the CCP seeks not “one-world communism” so much as a China-centered, sovereignty-based order. |
|
7–11: Western concessions, trade dependence, disarmament |
Partial |
CCP supports economic interdependence when useful, and rhetorically favors arms control, but simultaneously modernizes PLA and nuclear/missile forces. |
|
12–16: weaken U.S. loyalty/security mechanisms, courts, parties |
Weak / U.S.-specific |
The CCP does not mainly “capture” U.S. parties directly. Its real analogue is united front/influence work, elite capture, diaspora pressure, lobbying, and narrative warfare. Xi has called united front work a “magic weapon.” |
|
17–18: control schools, teachers, student media |
Strong |
This aligns closely inside PRC and Hong Kong. China’s Patriotic Education Law requires education in Marxism-Leninism, CCP history, socialism, national security, heroes/martyrs, and Xi-era ideology. |
|
19–21: control press, radio, TV, cultural organs |
Strong |
China has one of the world’s most restrictive media environments, with direct ownership, accreditation controls, penalties, and daily directives to media outlets. |
|
22–24: degrade art, promote obscenity, eliminate obscenity laws |
Mostly diverges |
The CCP controls art and culture ideologically, yes. But it does not promote obscenity; it censors pornography and sexual expression heavily. |
|
25–26: normalize homosexuality/promiscuity |
Diverges |
Modern CCP policy is socially conservative, family-centered, natalist, and often hostile to LGBTQ visibility. |
|
27–28: infiltrate churches, weaken religion |
Strong, but in CCP style |
The CCP does not merely “infiltrate” religion; it subordinates religion to Party-state control through registration, surveillance, and “sinicization.” Recent reports describe tightened control over Uyghur Muslims and Catholics. |
|
29–31: discredit constitution, founding history, American culture |
Partial |
Domestically, the CCP glorifies PRC/CCP history. Internationally, it attacks “Western constitutionalism,” separation of powers, and liberal democracy. AP reported China’s campaign to purge “Western erroneous views” from legal education. |
|
32–33: centralize welfare, education, mental health; remove legal barriers |
Strong |
The PRC is highly centralized under Party leadership. National security law, data law, counterespionage law, and intelligence law expand state reach. The National Intelligence Law requires citizens and organizations to support and cooperate with intelligence work. |
|
34–35: abolish HUAC, discredit FBI |
U.S.-specific |
Not directly relevant. CCP propaganda often discredits U.S. security agencies, but this is not the core of CCP governance. |
|
36–37: infiltrate unions and big business |
Strong domestically / partial abroad |
In China, unions are state-controlled and companies increasingly host Party cells. Abroad, influence occurs through business associations, diaspora groups, chambers, and united front-linked networks. |
|
38: transfer arrest powers to social agencies |
Weak / transformed |
Not literally. But China’s governance does blur police, neighborhood committees, platforms, schools, employers, and surveillance systems into a social-control network. |
|
39–40: dominate the UN / use courts to weaken institutions |
Partial / divergent |
China supports UN-centered multilateralism when it protects sovereignty and PRC legitimacy; it does not seek a liberal “world government.” Its Global Security Initiative stresses sovereignty and “indivisible security.” |
|
41: use mental-health institutions politically |
Partial / sensitive |
There have been reports of psychiatric detention abuses in China, but this is not the central, visible mechanism of CCP rule compared with police, surveillance, courts, and administrative detention. |
|
42: create student riots |
Mostly diverges |
The CCP suppresses autonomous student protest inside China. Abroad, it may mobilize nationalist students, but not usually to create leftist “riots” in the Skousen sense. |
|
43: overthrow colonial governments |
Historical partial |
Maoist China supported revolutionary and anti-colonial movements. Current CCP strategy is more state-capitalist, developmental, diplomatic, and coercive than classic guerrilla export. |
|
44–45: international communist domination / weaken Western civilization |
Partial, but reframed |
The CCP today is less about exporting Marxist revolution than about securing Party rule, absorbing Taiwan, reshaping global norms, weakening liberal-democratic criticism, and making the world safer for authoritarian capitalism. |
My conclusion
Skousen’s list misreads communism as cultural chaos. The CCP is not trying to create chaos in China. It wants order, obedience, surveillance, hierarchy, nationalism, historical control, and Party permanence.
So the best formula is:
Skousen imagined communism as subversion of society.
The CCP practices communism as capture of society.
Not “everything falls apart,” but:
everything returns to the Party.
