The "hard problem of consciousness" refers to the challenge of explaining why and how subjective experiences arise from physical processes in the brain. Coined by philosopher David Chalmers, it contrasts with the "easy problems" of consciousness, which involve explaining cognitive functions and brain mechanisms (such as perception, memory, and behavior) that can be tackled using standard scientific methods.
The hard problem asks why certain physical processes in the brain are accompanied by conscious experience. For example, why does the processing of sensory information lead to the feeling of pain or the experience of seeing red? This problem remains difficult because, even with a complete understanding of brain functions, it is unclear how these functions give rise to the subjective quality of experience, known as qualia.
In summary, the hard problem of consciousness is about understanding why and how physical processes in the brain produce the subjective experience of being conscious.
物何以至心 （前五識，物矣，自然無心，鳶飛魚躍爾，至第六識初期皆然），心何以至自覺的心 (災難實始于此，起因是第六識後期，接收資料，多且龐雜，以致急于，收攝末那，據為己有，成其所謂，一家之言），自覺的心何以至人類世的廢墟 （末那方起，波的功能即塌陷，這個世界，遂墮入牛頓物理的世界，不復自然；末那方泯，波的功能即復甦，這個世界，遂重返量子物理，阿賴耶識的世界，回到自然），
