Your argument suggests that the rise of the CCP is fundamentally dependent on political control, rather than purely on economic factors. The phrase “集中力量办大事” (mobilizing concentrated resources for grand projects) reflects the CCP’s centralized governance model, where the state directs large-scale initiatives with little to no opposition. This model relies on a submissive population—one that does not challenge authority, allowing the party to impose policies unilaterally. If this submission were to break, economic growth alone might not sustain the CCP’s rule.
This perspective shifts the focus from economic determinism (the idea that China’s rise is solely due to market reforms and GDP growth) to political determinism—arguing that China’s trajectory is first and foremost a product of the CCP’s ability to maintain political control and societal obedience.
Supporting Arguments for Political Determinism Over Economic Determinism:
1. Economic Development Serves Political Legitimacy, Not the Other Way Around
• The CCP did not pursue economic reform out of ideological conviction (Maoist communism originally rejected market forces). Instead, Deng Xiaoping’s reforms were a pragmatic survival strategy after Mao’s disastrous policies (Great Leap Forward, Cultural Revolution). The party’s primary concern was maintaining power, and economic growth became a tool to sustain legitimacy, not an end in itself.
• Unlike democratic nations where economic downturns might lead to leadership changes, the CCP cannot afford such political risks. Economic policy is subordinate to political control. If economic liberalization ever threatened party dominance, the CCP would sacrifice growth to preserve power (e.g., recent crackdowns on tech giants, capital flight restrictions, and stronger ideological campaigns under Xi Jinping).
2. China’s “Success” Model Depends on Coercion, Not Just Efficiency
• Economic modernization under an authoritarian state is different from free-market development. China’s rapid industrialization has been state-driven, relying on forced urbanization, party-controlled financial systems, and labor exploitation rather than purely market forces.
• This is why China’s rise is not easily replicable elsewhere—it is not just about infrastructure or industry, but about the political conditions that enable the CCP to force through policies without consent. The Three Gorges Dam, Belt and Road Initiative, high-speed rail network—these projects were implemented with little regard for opposition, environmental concerns, or property rights.
• The hukou (household registration) system has historically restricted internal migration, ensuring that surplus rural labor fuels urban economic zones without granting them full rights, effectively turning millions into second-class economic units rather than full citizens.
3. China’s Economy is Fragile Without Political Submission
• If the Chinese population were not politically docile, the economic system would collapse not because of financial crises alone, but because of governance failure. Unlike Western countries, where political institutions provide mechanisms to correct economic failures, China’s system relies on top-down mandates—meaning that if societal obedience weakens, the whole system lacks resilience.
• The real estate crisis, local government debt, youth unemployment, and capital outflow are symptoms of an economic model that worked when the people played along. The CCP can suppress dissent only so long as the promise of stability holds. But if people stop accepting “sacrificing today for tomorrow”, then social control, not economic hardship alone, will become the CCP’s biggest challenge.
The Real Test: What Happens When the Chinese People Stop Being “Slaves”?
If submission is the foundation of China’s economic and political order, then the real determinant of China’s future is not GDP growth but political obedience. If cracks appear in the CCP’s ability to enforce submission (whether through ideology, propaganda, or coercion), then:
• Economic decline will not be just a financial issue—it will become a regime crisis.
• Even with economic development, political pressure (censorship, surveillance, repression) will have to increase, leading to diminishing returns on governance efficiency.
• The greatest threat to the CCP is not Western economic competition, but internal disobedience—whether from workers, the middle class, or even elites.
Thus, your argument is valid: The CCP’s power is not sustained by economic success, but by the political system that ensures the population remains passive. Economic development is a tool, not the core mechanism of control. The real battle for China’s future is not between GDP figures, but between the CCP’s demand for absolute control and the people’s willingness to submit.
Conclusion:
• If the Chinese people remain content with being “slaves” under authoritarian rule, then the CCP will continue to function, even if the economy slows.
• If submission breaks down, then economic growth won’t save the regime—because the true pillar of China’s rise is not economics, but political obedience.
• The transformation of the political system, rather than economic changes, will determine whether China remains stable or enters a period of upheaval.
