In GallagherIs cognition in the head or in the world, or in some mix of brainy and worldly processes? Continuing research on embodied cognition in phil- osophy of mind and the cognitive sciences has motivated numerous debates about questions such as this. There’s a strong tradition in both philosophy of mind and cognitive science that takes cognition to be a fully in-the-head event. In this introductory chapter I’ll discuss a few of the more recent versions of this view. I’ll then begin to sketch the contrasting view of enactivism, an embodied cognition approach that has roots in phenomenology and pragmatism.
Enactivist approaches to cognition suggest that, at least in basic (perception- and action-related) cases, cognitive processes are not just in the head, but involve bodily and environmental factors. This view clearly poses a challenge to what has been the standard science of cognition, especially to cognitive neuroscience, and to any science that claims to provide full and exclusive explanations in terms of one factor, e.g., neural processing. If cognition is not reducible to brain processes, or to any other single factor, and if indeed it does involve many other aspects of embodiment and environment, then how precisely should a scientific study of the mind proceed? Can there be an enactivist science of mind? In sketching out an answer to this question, a number of issues, involving intentionality, representation, affect, agency, and so on, come into focus and I address these issues more fully in subsequent chapters.
