Alain Badiou uses the term antiphilosophy to describe thinkers who, rather than engaging in philosophy as a constructive system-building enterprise, undermine or radically challenge its foundations, often from an external position. They do not simply critique certain philosophical ideas; rather, they call into question philosophy’s very right to exist in its traditional form.
Badiou applies this concept to figures like Lacan and Wittgenstein, seeing them as antiphilosophers because they attempt to redirect thought away from philosophy’s abstractions and toward something more immediate, more lived, or more constrained by other disciplines (psychoanalysis, logic, ethics, etc.).
1. Antiphilosophy as a Mode of Thought
For Badiou, philosophy seeks truth through concepts, reason, and systematization. Antiphilosophy, by contrast, is an attack on philosophy’s claim to universal, systematic truth. Antiphilosophers believe that:
Philosophy is delusional in its quest for truth - it constructs grand systems that fail to recognize their own limitations.
Truth does not belong to philosophy but to something else (e.g., psychoanalysis for Lacan, ordinary language for Wittgenstein).
The philosopher is a kind of fraud, disguising subjective constructions as objective truths.
Antiphilosophy is not simply anti-intellectualism - it is a radical reconfiguration of the purpose of thought, often through irony, paradox, or self-imposed constraints.
2. Lacan as an Antiphilosopher
Jacques Lacan represents antiphilosophy in the psychoanalytic tradition. For Badiou, Lacan’s challenge to philosophy is twofold:
1. The Subject is Not Rational
Traditional philosophy (from Descartes to Hegel) assumes a thinking subject capable of reason and truth.
Lacan, however, argues that the subject is divided (split between the unconscious and the symbolic order).
Rather than being the source of rational knowledge, the subject is structured by language and the unconscious, meaning that philosophy’s appeal to “reason” is always compromised.
2. Truth is a Psychoanalytic Event, Not a Philosophical System
Lacan does not reject truth outright, but he relocates it. Truth is not something philosophy can define universally - it erupts in moments of psychoanalytic experience, particularly in acts of speech (the Real) that rupture ordinary symbolic structures.
Philosophy wants truth to be knowable, but Lacan insists that truth is always partial, fractured, and impossible to fully articulate.
This makes psychoanalysis a site of truth in a way that philosophy cannot be.
For Badiou, Lacan’s antiphilosophy works by making philosophy irrelevant - if you want real insight into subjectivity, don’t look at Descartes or Heidegger, look at Freud, dreams, slips of the tongue, and the limits of language.
3. Wittgenstein as an Antiphilosopher
Badiou also considers Wittgenstein an antiphilosopher, but in a different way. While Lacan undermines philosophy from the standpoint of psychoanalysis, Wittgenstein undermines it from the standpoint of language and logic.
1. Early Wittgenstein (Tractatus): Philosophy is a Misuse of Language
In Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Wittgenstein argues that philosophy’s traditional questions are meaningless because they misuse language.
The world consists of facts, not abstract metaphysical concepts.
If something cannot be logically stated, it must be passed over in silence (Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, daruber muss man schweigen).
This limits philosophy’s domain significantly: no more metaphysics, no more speculative systems - only logical propositions remain meaningful.
2. Later Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations): Philosophy is Just a Language Game
In his later work, Wittgenstein moves from logic to language games - showing that meaning is not fixed but determined by how words are used in specific social contexts.
This means philosophy is not about discovering universal truths, but merely analyzing how words function in everyday life.
Instead of grand theories of reality, we should focus on how words are used in practical situations.
For Badiou, Wittgenstein’s antiphilosophy is more subtle than Lacan’s. He does not attack philosophy as much as he shrinks it, making it seem trivial and redundant. The entire “mystery” of philosophy dissolves once you realize that most philosophical problems are just linguistic confusions.
4. Badiou’s Own View: Against Antiphilosophy
Badiou rejects both Lacan’s and Wittgenstein’s antiphilosophy because he defends philosophy’s right to construct universal truths.
Lacanian psychoanalysis is too limited - truth is not just found in psychoanalytic events but also in mathematics, politics, art, and love (Badiou’s four truth procedures).
Wittgenstein is too deflationary - Badiou insists that philosophy is not just a language game but a field where real transformations in thought occur.
For Badiou, antiphilosophy is ultimately too cynical - it strips philosophy of its ambition and leaves us with either psychoanalytic insight (Lacan) or ordinary language analysis (Wittgenstein), neither of which can address universal truths in the way philosophy can.
5. Conclusion: Antiphilosophy as a Necessary Challenge
Even though Badiou opposes antiphilosophy, he takes it seriously because:
It forces philosophy to justify itself against attacks from psychoanalysis, logic, and pragmatism.
It reveals philosophy’s limits - Lacan and Wittgenstein both expose areas where philosophy oversteps itself.
It prevents philosophy from becoming too self-important - since antiphilosophy constantly reminds us that truth may lie elsewhere.
Ultimately, antiphilosophy does not destroy philosophy, but it forces it to be more rigorous. If philosophy survives Lacan and Wittgenstein, it is because it has learned to defend itself without illusions.
Would you say, then, that a bit of antiphilosophy is necessary to keep philosophy from taking itself too seriously - just like psychotherapy?
