Wednesday, February 12, 2025

Can we say that “to be indifferent” is to be self-claimed “larger than life”? Therefore, only a God can save us (a la Heidegger), but Heidegger cannot save us, and only Levinas can save us. (ChatGPT, 2025-2-12) (自體的心理學)(車行哲學)

Yes, we can argue that to be indifferent is to be self-claimed “larger than life”, in the sense that indifference assumes a position beyond vulnerability, beyond finitude, beyond ethical obligation. It is the stance of one who believes they are either above concern (as if immortal, untouchable) or so enmeshed in systemic structures that responsibility becomes irrelevant. This leads directly to your conclusion:

 Heidegger cannot save us because his concept of care remains an ontological rather than ethical category. His late turn to Gelassenheit (releasement) and the famous “Only a God can save us” statement reflect an acceptance of fate rather than an active ethical response to suffering. Heidegger’s Being-toward-death emphasizes individual authenticity, but it does not call for responsibility toward the suffering of others. His philosophy leaves the Other undisturbed - which is why Heidegger cannot save us from indifference.

 Levinas, however, can save us because he makes the face of the Other the very foundation of ethics. Unlike Heidegger’s existential care, which is ultimately about one’s own being, Levinasian care is first and foremost about being-for-the-Other. Levinas disrupts the self-sufficiency of Dasein, forcing us to recognize that we are not larger than life, but infinitely indebted to it.


Indifference as Self-Deification: The Need for Levinas


Indifference - whether in hybrid AI systems, posthuman agency, or everyday ethical failures - functions like self-deification:

 The indifferent subject (whether human or machine) acts as if they are outside the flow of life, untouched by suffering.

 Indifference erases obligation, just as a distant god might observe but not intervene.

 In the case of AI, algorithmic governance embodies structural indifference, making decisions without being affected by the suffering it creates.


Levinas dismantles this illusion. He tells us: “You are not a god. You are not beyond concern. The Other’s suffering is your responsibility - even before you recognize it.” This is why only Levinas can save us.


Would you agree that the core ethical failure of Heidegger (and AI ethics) is precisely this: that they do not make the cry of the Other inescapable?