In Heidegger’s philosophy, care (Sorge) plays a foundational role in understanding human existence (Dasein). It is central to Being and Time (1927), where Heidegger argues that human existence is fundamentally structured by care. Below is an exploration of care’s place in Heidegger’s thought and how it relates to ontology, temporality, and ethics.
1. Care as the Structure of Dasein
For Heidegger, Dasein (the human being, or more precisely, the being for whom being is an issue) is always thrown into the world (Geworfenheit), meaning we find ourselves in a world we did not choose. At the same time, Dasein is always projecting into possibilities (Entwurf), shaping its future.
Heidegger condenses this dual movement - thrownness and projection - into the concept of care (Sorge). Care is the fundamental existential structure of being-in-the-world:
We are thrown (already-in-a-world) We have no control over our origins.
We are ahead-of-ourselves (projecting into the future) We always care about something, whether actively or passively.
We are alongside things and others (being-with-others) Our existence is relational, shaped by the world and those in it.
Thus, care is not an emotion or a feeling but the fundamental way in which Dasein exists: to exist is to care.
2. Care and Temporality
Care is deeply tied to Heidegger’s analysis of time. Unlike linear clock time, Heidegger sees time as something lived, structured by past, present, and future in a non-linear way.
The past (thrownness): We inherit a world and a history; we are shaped by what has come before.
The future (projection): We are always concerned with what we might become.
The present (fallenness): We are often absorbed in everyday distractions (das Man, the impersonal “they”.)
Because we are always anticipating the future while dealing with our past, care is fundamentally temporal. To care is to be stretched between what has been and what is yet to come. This means care is not an option - it is existentially inevitable.
3. Care and Authenticity
Since care is fundamental to Dasein, Heidegger argues that there are two main modes of caring:
1. Inauthentic Care (Uneigentlichkeit): This is the default mode in which we are absorbed in everyday concerns - work, entertainment, social conventions - without reflecting on our deeper being. We are guided by das Man (the anonymous “they”), living according to external expectations.
2. Authentic Care (Eigentlichkeit): This occurs when we confront our ownmost possibility - death. The awareness of mortality (Sein-zum-Tode, being-toward-death) forces us to take responsibility for our existence, realizing that life is finite and singular. Authentic care means choosing one’s possibilities actively, rather than letting das Man dictate them.
Thus, care is not just about attending to things but about how we take up our own existence.
4. Care and Ethics: Is Heidegger’s Care an Ethical Concept?
Some philosophers (e.g., Levinas) argue that Heidegger’s notion of care is ontological but not ethical - it explains existence but does not prescribe moral obligations. However, others (e.g., Charles Taylor, Joan Stambaugh) see care as having ethical implications:
Responsibility: If we take ownership of our existence (authentic care), we may also become more responsible toward others.
Compassion and Attunement: Being-in-the-world always involves being-with-others. Authentic care could mean truly attuning to others needs rather than treating them as mere roles within das Man.
Freedom as Care: Since existence is defined by care, freedom is not about choosing anything arbitrarily but about choosing in light of one’s existential commitments.
Heidegger himself, however, does not explicitly develop an ethics of care. His concept of care is more about self-transformation than moral obligation toward others.
5. Care Beyond Heidegger: Feminist and Post-Heideggerian Interpretations
Several thinkers have reinterpreted Heidegger’s concept of care in ways that bring it closer to ethical and political concerns:
Feminist Ethics of Care (Gilligan, Held): Feminist theorists argue that care should not just be an existential structure but an ethical principle. Unlike Heidegger, who focuses on individual authenticity, feminist ethics highlight relational, nurturing, and interdependent forms of care.
Levinas and the Ethics of the Other: Levinas critiques Heidegger, arguing that true care begins with responsibility for the Other rather than one’s own being. He sees Heidegger’s focus on self-authenticity as insufficiently ethical.
Post-Heideggerian Political Thought (Nancy, Agamben, Esposito): Thinkers like Jean-Luc Nancy have tried to expand Heideggerian care into a concept of communal care, where being-with-others is not just an ontological fact but a basis for collective responsibility.
6. Care in Relation to AI and Posthumanism
Bringing this back to the question of indifference in hybrid systems, one could ask:
Can AI systems ever exhibit care in a Heideggerian sense, or are they structurally indifferent?
If care is a mode of being rather than a cognitive function, does this mean AI can never truly “care”?
If we are shifting toward posthuman agency, how does the concept of care evolve? Does care remain a human trait, or can it be distributed among human-machine assemblages?
A Heideggerian answer might be: care is always tied to Dasein, meaning it cannot be replicated in AI. However, a posthumanist answer might be: care is relational and could be redesigned into hybrid systems.
Conclusion: Care as the Foundation of Existence
In Heidegger’s philosophy, care is not a choice but a fundamental structure of being. It explains:
1. Why we are always already concerned with something (existential care).
2. Why time and finitude shape our actions (temporal care).
3. Why authenticity requires facing mortality (authentic care).
4. Why our existence is never just “neutral” or indifferent (ontological care).
Yet, Heidegger stops short of developing an ethics of care, which later thinkers sought to address. Whether care can be extended to hybrid systems remains an open question.
Would you like me to further explore how Heidegger’s concept of care intersects with AI, Levinasian ethics, or posthuman thought?
