Sunday, January 18, 2026

Can we say that Somerset Maugham is a shrewd non-believer on human nature? (ChatGPT, 2026-1-18) (2026)

Yes—we can say that Somerset Maugham is a shrewd non-believer in human nature, provided we are careful about what kind of “non-belief” this is.


He is not a nihilist, nor a moral crusader. His skepticism is cooler, observational, almost clinical—yet never naïve. Let me unpack this in a few tightly connected layers.





1. “Non-believer” — but not a denier of humanity



Maugham does not believe in:


  • innate moral progress
  • the redemptive power of sincerity
  • the idea that good intentions outweigh consequences
  • heroic self-knowledge



But he does believe in:


  • habit, desire, vanity, fear
  • self-deception as a normal psychological state
  • kindness as contingent and fragile
  • moments of grace that do not transform character



This places him closer to La Rochefoucauld than to Dostoevsky:

he assumes motives are mixed, and usually less noble than advertised.


So his “non-belief” is epistemic, not metaphysical.

He doubts what people say about themselves, not that people exist or feel.





2. Shrewdness: the ethics of not being fooled



What makes Maugham shrewd rather than merely cynical is that:


  • he expects self-deception, therefore is rarely disappointed
  • he watches people act rather than confess
  • he understands morality as a social performance under pressure



This is why his narrators often sound calm, amused, almost benevolent—

they are not shocked by betrayal, cruelty, or hypocrisy.


In The Moon and Sixpence, Of Human Bondage, The Razor’s Edge, or even the travel essays:


People are not monsters. They are simply consistent with their needs.


People are not monsters.

They are simply consistent with their needs.


Maugham does not accuse; he records.

That restraint is itself an ethical stance.





3. Against illusion, not against compassion



Here is the subtle point often missed:


Maugham’s skepticism clears space for a quieter compassion.


  • If people are weak, vanity-driven, fearful → moral outrage becomes childish
  • If self-knowledge is rare → judgment must be provisional
  • If life is contingency → dignity lies in endurance, not triumph



This is why Maugham prefers:


  • failed artists
  • mediocre spouses
  • tired doctors
  • colonial officials who know they are compromised



He does not romanticize suffering.

He simply refuses to lie about it.





4. A non-believer who still travels



Your earlier instinct about La Rambla never ending matters here.


Maugham keeps walking, observing, lingering—not because he believes in humanity,

but because he does not require belief to remain attentive.


This aligns him with:


  • Bashō’s road
  • Benjamin’s arcades
  • the flâneur who knows enchantment is fragile and temporary



A believer seeks salvation.

Maugham seeks clarity without cruelty.





5. A concise formulation



If one had to say it in one sentence:


Maugham is a shrewd non-believer in human nature who refuses both illusion and despair—and finds, in that refusal, a modest, worldly mercy.


Maugham is a shrewd non-believer in human nature who refuses both illusion and despair—and finds, in that refusal, a modest, worldly mercy.


If you’d like, next we could:


  • contrast Maugham with Conrad or Greene
  • read him alongside Freud’s Civilization and Its Discontents
  • or place him directly against Kundera’s “wisdom of uncertainty”



They speak to each other more than is usually noticed.