Can scientific materalialism find its way out of self-destruction? (ChatGPT, 2024-10-3)

The idea that scientific materialism could lead to its own “self-destruction” reflects concerns that this worldview, which interprets the universe purely through the lens of matter and mechanistic processes, may be inherently limited or harmful in its consequences. Critics, like Matthew David Segall and thinkers influenced by Alfred North Whitehead, argue that scientific materialism has led to a fragmented understanding of reality that neglects the interconnectedness of nature, consciousness, and ethics  .

For scientific materialism to avoid self-destruction, some scholars argue that it would need to undergo significant revision or expansion. This might involve integrating more holistic, relational, or process-oriented perspectives, such as those found in Whitehead’s process philosophy. These approaches challenge the materialist reduction of reality to mere atoms and void, suggesting instead that the universe is a dynamic, evolving system in which subjective experience and values matter as much as physical laws.

Moreover, materialism’s self-destructive tendencies are evident in ecological crises, where treating nature as an inert resource leads to environmental degradation. Philosophers like Segall suggest that moving away from mechanistic materialism toward a worldview that sees the cosmos as “ensouled” or inherently meaningful could foster a more sustainable relationship between humanity and the Earth 

| Yale Forum on Religion and Ecology.

In short, while scientific materialism has made significant contributions to our understanding of the universe, many thinkers argue that it must evolve to include dimensions of meaning, ethics, and interconnectedness in order to overcome its self-destructive tendencies.

What’s ‘cosmologically ensouled interpretation’ as proposed by Matthew David Segall? (ChatGPT, 2024-10-3)

Matthew David Segall’s concept of a “cosmologically ensouled interpretation” emerges from his engagement with the process philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead. This interpretation challenges the reductionist and mechanistic views of the cosmos that dominate modern science, which often describe the universe in purely physical and mathematical terms devoid of meaning or purpose.

In contrast, Segall argues for an understanding of the cosmos as inherently meaningful and alive, suggesting that both physics and chemistry are not just descriptions of inert matter but involve living, organized processes at different scales. This view reintroduces a sense of soul or life into the cosmos, suggesting that the universe itself may be seen as a kind of living organism, or at least as something that is deeply interconnected with consciousness and subjectivity, rather than being purely mechanistic.

This approach is influenced by Whitehead’s philosophy, which critiques the “bifurcation of nature”—the separation of human consciousness from the rest of the universe. In a cosmologically ensouled interpretation, consciousness is not seen as an anomaly but as integral to the cosmos. It offers a more holistic way of understanding the universe that bridges the gap between science and spiritual or ethical dimensions, suggesting that the universe is imbued with purpose and creativity, not just mechanical causality   

| Yale Forum on Religion and Ecology.

Deferent and epicycle (均輪和本輪）

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deferent_and_epicycle

https://zh.wikipedia.org/zh-tw/%E5%9D%87%E8%BC%AA%E5%92%8C%E6%9C%AC%E8%BC%AA

Is contemporary cosmology in an epicyclic phase of theoretical development? （ChatGPT, 2024-10-3)

The suggestion that contemporary cosmology might be in an “epicyclic phase” of theoretical development refers to the historical analogy with the Ptolemaic model of the cosmos, which used increasingly complex layers of epicycles (small circular orbits superimposed on larger orbits) to account for the observed movements of planets. These adjustments were made to preserve the geocentric framework, even as the model became less elegant and more complicated.

If we apply this analogy to contemporary cosmology, the question asks whether current cosmological theories, like the Ptolemaic system before the Copernican revolution, are becoming overly complex and perhaps convoluted in an attempt to account for observations without fundamentally changing the underlying framework.

There are debates about whether certain models in contemporary cosmology, especially those involving dark matter, dark energy, and inflation, could represent an “epicyclic” phase. For example:

1. Dark Matter and Dark Energy: These concepts were introduced to explain phenomena that don’t fit neatly into our current understanding of gravity and the large-scale structure of the universe. Some critics argue that introducing dark matter and dark energy is analogous to adding epicycles—attempting to salvage existing theories (like General Relativity) rather than radically rethinking the framework.

2. Cosmic Inflation: The inflationary model, which posits a rapid expansion of the universe shortly after the Big Bang, has become more intricate to account for various observations. Some physicists feel that this growing complexity might indicate that inflation is an “epicycle-like” solution rather than a fundamentally correct understanding of the early universe.

However, the analogy has limits. Cosmology is based on empirical data, and new theories like dark matter and dark energy are formulated in response to precise observations, such as galactic rotation curves and cosmic microwave background measurements. Unlike the Ptolemaic system, which was fundamentally based on incorrect assumptions (geocentrism), modern cosmological models are deeply rooted in observational data.

In short, while some theorists argue that certain aspects of cosmology (e.g., dark matter, dark energy) might represent a patchwork of epicycles, others contend that these are well-motivated and empirically necessary developments. The question remains open, but the “epicyclic phase” analogy is a provocative way to consider whether cosmology might be due for a revolutionary shift.

長夜孤魂

https://youtu.be/o3JNrhN8-8I?si=MLzqIdwmJvo5yiBn

「1813」 —- What does the phrase ‘in the aftermath of German Idealism’ mean? Can we say that Husserl’s phenomenology was a response to that aftermath? (ChatGPT, 2024-10-3)

The phrase “in the aftermath of German Idealism” refers to the intellectual period following the peak of German Idealism, particularly after the works of philosophers like Immanuel Kant, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. German Idealism was a major philosophical movement that explored the nature of reality, consciousness, and the relationship between mind and world, emphasizing that reality is shaped by the mind’s activity.

The “aftermath” indicates a time when thinkers began to react to, critique, and move beyond German Idealism. Some philosophers tried to address perceived shortcomings or contradictions in Idealism, while others sought alternative approaches to the problems it posed. This period gave rise to new schools of thought, including Marxism, existentialism, and phenomenology, all of which, to varying degrees, grappled with German Idealism’s legacy.

Husserl’s phenomenology can be seen as a response to this aftermath. Husserl sought to address some of the unresolved problems of German Idealism, particularly the tension between subjectivity and objectivity. While German Idealists like Hegel emphasized the absolute unity of thought and being, Husserl sought to ground philosophy in the direct description of experience, emphasizing the intentionality of consciousness—how consciousness is always directed toward something. His method of epoché (bracketing assumptions) aimed to set aside metaphysical speculations about the nature of reality, returning philosophy to a study of phenomena as they appear to consciousness.

In this way, phenomenology can be seen as both a continuation of and a response to the issues raised by German Idealism, especially its focus on the role of the subject in constituting reality. Husserl, like the Idealists, was concerned with the conditions of knowledge and experience but took a different methodological path to address these questions.

The Abyss of Freedom/Ages of the World (Slavoj Zizek (Author), Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Von Schelling (Author), 1997)

In the last decade, F. W. J. von Schelling has emerged as one of the key philosophers of German Idealism, the one who, for the first time, undermined Kant's philosophical revolution and in so doing opened up the way for a viable critique of Hegel. In noted philosopher Slavoj Zizek's view, the main orientations of the post-Hegelian thought, from Kierkegaard and Marx, to Heidegger and today's deconstructionism, were prefigured in Schelling's analysis of Hegel's idealism, and in his affirmation that the contingency of existence cannot be reduced to notional self-mediation. In The Abyss of Freedom, Zizek attempts to advance Schelling's stature even further, with a commentary of the second draft of Schelling's work The Ages of the World, written in 1813.

Zizek argues that Schelling's most profound thoughts are found in the series of three consecutive attempts he made to formulate the "ages of the world/Weltalter," the stages of the self-development of the Absolute. Of the three versions, claims Zizek, it is the second that is the most eloquent and definitive encompassing of Schelling's lyrical thought. It centers on the problem of how the Absolute (God) himself, in order to become actual, to exist effectively, has to accomplish a radically contingent move of acquiring material, bodily existence. Never before available in English, this version finally renders accessible one of the key texts of modern philosophy, a text that is widely debated in philosophical circles today.

The Abyss of Freedom is Zizek's own reading of Schelling based upon Lacanian psychoanalytic theory. It focuses on the notion that Lacan's theory--which claims that the symbolic universe emerged from presymbolic drives--is prefigured in Schelling's idea of logos as given birth to from the vortex of primordial drives, or from what "in God is not yet God." For Zizek, this connection is monumental, showing that Schelling's ideas forcefully presage the post-modern "deconstruction" of logocentrism.

Slavoj Zizek is not a philosopher who stoops to conquer objects but a radical voice who believes that philosophy is nothing if it is not embodied, nothing if it is only abstract. For him, true philosophy always speaks of something rather than nothing. Those interested in the genesis of contemporary thought and the fate of reason in our "age of anxiety" will find this coupling of texts not only philosophically relevant, but vitally important.

Slavoj Zizek is the author of The Sublime Object of Ideology, Tarrying with the Negative: Kant, Hegel and the Critique of Ideology, and most recently, The Indivisible Remainder: An Essay on Schelling and Related Matters.Currently he is a Senior Researcher at the Institute for Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana. Judith Norman is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Trinity University in San Antonio, Texas.

Nowhere is the endeavor to comprehend this enigma more strenuous than in the three drafts of Die Weltalter ("Ages of the World") from 181 to 1815. (Ibid, p. 2)

The three drafts remain fragments: all of them contain only book 1 of the planned trilogy of "Past," "Present," and "Future." They are interrupted at the crucial point of giving an account of the differentiation between Past and Present, of the emergence of the Word from the self-enclosed rotary motion of drives. However, in their very failure, they are arguably the acme of German Idealism and, simultaneously, a breakthrough into an unknown domain whose contours became discernible only in the aftermath of German Idealism. This breakthrough is most tangible in the second draft, and for this reason it was chosen for translation in the present volume. The work bears witness to such an effort of thought that it is almost painful to read. (ibid, pp. 3-4)

It is now clear that the entire post-Hegelian constellation - from Marxism to the existentialist notion of finitude and temporality as the ultimate horizon of being, from deconstructionist "decentering" of the self-presence of logos to New Age obscurantism - has its roots in Schelling's late philosophy. (Ibid, p. 4)

Ghost Rider (2007)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ghost_Rider_(2007_film) (Netflix)

沒有見過這麼窩囊的颱風 — 山陀小屁兒 （10/2 10/3）

這個世界，不缺小屁孩，剛剛我跟 D 君說，柯文哲錯在斤斤計較小錢，你要理解，小錢人多口雜，事跡敗露，防不勝防，所謂小錢，就是境內，以新台幣結算的錢，比如說，4740 / 4300 萬，210 / 157 萬，所謂非小錢，就是大錢，就是境外，加密貨幣，區塊鏈，洗到天涯海角，那種神不知鬼不覺的錢，比如說，三十億台幣，三百億台幣，三千億台幣，你要理解，台灣的貪污，比起共匪胃口，芝麻綠豆不如，區區一個許家印，就搞掉十萬億人民幣，那個有頭有臉的趙家人，不搞個十萬八萬億美金，就不配姓趙，意思是說，柯文哲這種，所謂 157，沈慶京這種，所謂財團，在共匪眼中，芝麻綠豆不如，以上說明，滅共首須滅（五百）趙，他們生飲中國人民精血，生換中國人民器官，本來民眾黨，理應為滅共護台而立，殊知搞成小錢糞坑，柯某實在有愧渭水，

有一種書寫，要求作者，以餘生換之，比如說，謝林寫 The Ages of the World，一寫就寫了四十年，結果改寫二十次，只寫了三分之一，的三個版本 （1811, 1813, 1815)，這件事說明，老謝應該迂迴，應該說，我今天下午要去墾丁，意思是說，謝林錯在，前半生移動，後半生卻動彈不得，中年續絃幼妻，連生六兒女，又被供在柏林大學，扮演道貌岸然的精神導師，遂與這個世界，只可能沒有半毛錢關係，你要理解，唯有流浪車行者，行走于這個世界，才能告訴你，這個世界，大約光景如何，

周四近午，山陀小屁兒，仍未登陸，風較昨小，德國觀念論，執意唯心，其衰遂意涵，唯物的反撲，現象學存在主義，則採經驗論，以避唯心唯物之爭，謝林在理性的邊界，亦預見了精神分析的到來，

What’s the affinity and difference between the philosophy of Spinoza and Schelling? （ChatGPT, 2024-10-2)(negativity vs vitality)(車行形上學）（metaphysics of van life)

The philosophies of **Spinoza** and **Schelling** share significant points of affinity, particularly in their focus on the unity of nature and the divine, but they also differ sharply in their metaphysical approaches, particularly concerning the nature of freedom, the role of individuality, and their understandings of the relationship between the finite and the infinite. Here’s a comparison of their major similarities and differences:

### Affinities Between Spinoza and Schelling:

1. **Monism and the Unity of Being**:

   - **Spinoza**: Spinoza is known for his radical monism, where God and Nature (Deus sive Natura) are one and the same substance. For him, there is only one substance, and everything that exists is a mode of that substance. This means that God is not a separate entity from the world; rather, the world itself, and everything in it, is an expression of God.

   - **Schelling**: Early in his career, Schelling also advocates for a form of monism, especially in his *Philosophy of Nature*. He argues that nature is not a separate creation but an expression of the Absolute — an underlying unity that manifests itself through both nature and human consciousness. Schelling’s concept of the Absolute has a similar unifying character to Spinoza’s substance, where the duality between mind and matter is overcome by recognizing their underlying unity.

   - **Affinity**: Both thinkers view the world as an expression of an immanent divine principle, and both reject a dualism between the spiritual and the material realms. They emphasize that nature and divinity are not separate entities but are deeply interconnected.

2. **Immanence**:

   - **Spinoza**: Spinoza’s philosophy is fundamentally immanent. God is not a transcendent creator who exists outside the world but is entirely present within the world. Everything that exists is a part of this divine substance, and thus there is no "outside" to the immanent order.

   - **Schelling**: In his early works, Schelling shares a similar view of immanence, especially in his *Philosophy of Nature*. For Schelling, nature is not something separate from the Absolute but an immanent expression of it. The divine is revealed through the processes of nature, and human consciousness is part of that unfolding.

   - **Affinity**: Both Spinoza and early Schelling promote an immanent view of the divine, seeing nature and the world as part of the unfolding of a singular, divine substance or principle.

3. **Pantheism**:

   - **Spinoza**: Spinoza’s philosophy is often interpreted as pantheistic, as he equates God with Nature. God is not a personal being or a creator outside the world, but the entire universe itself. Everything that exists is an expression of God’s infinite attributes.

   - **Schelling**: Schelling’s early work also has pantheistic elements, particularly his notion that nature is a visible manifestation of the Absolute. While Schelling later moves beyond a purely pantheistic outlook, in his early *Philosophy of Nature*, he shares Spinoza’s view that the divine is not a transcendent being but is immanent within the world.

### Differences Between Spinoza and Schelling:

1. **The Nature of the Absolute**:

   - **Spinoza**: Spinoza’s Absolute (God or Substance) is completely static and determined. Everything that happens is the result of a deterministic chain of causes, all of which are expressions of the one divine substance. There is no freedom in the sense of spontaneity or contingency because everything follows necessarily from the nature of God or Substance.

   - **Schelling**: Schelling’s concept of the Absolute evolves over time, and in his later works, he emphasizes the dynamic, creative nature of the Absolute. For Schelling, the Absolute is not a fixed, static substance, but a process of becoming that involves both necessity and freedom. Schelling’s later philosophy, especially in works like *The Ages of the World*, emphasizes the idea of a "ground" of the Absolute that is irrational and dark, a source of potentiality and freedom that precedes the emergence of order.

   - **Difference**: Spinoza’s Absolute is static, necessary, and fully determined, whereas Schelling’s Absolute becomes a dynamic, living process that includes both necessity and the possibility of freedom and creativity.

2. **Freedom and Necessity**:

   - **Spinoza**: For Spinoza, freedom is not the ability to choose between alternatives, but the understanding of necessity. True freedom is realizing that everything happens according to the laws of nature and accepting it. Human beings are part of the deterministic order, and our freedom consists in our intellectual understanding of this order.

   - **Schelling**: In contrast, Schelling places a strong emphasis on freedom as a real, metaphysical force. Particularly in his later work, Schelling sees freedom as fundamental to the nature of the Absolute. For Schelling, the world is not fully determined, and freedom involves the capacity for creativity, spontaneity, and the emergence of new possibilities. He posits an irrational "ground" of existence that allows for the existence of freedom alongside necessity.

   - **Difference**: Spinoza equates freedom with intellectual understanding and acceptance of necessity, whereas Schelling sees freedom as a real, creative force that allows for contingency and the emergence of new realities.

3. **The Role of the Individual**:

   - **Spinoza**: For Spinoza, individuals are modes of the one substance, and while they have a certain degree of individuality, they are ultimately determined by the larger order of nature. Individuality is not essential but rather a manifestation of the underlying substance.

   - **Schelling**: Schelling, particularly in his later philosophy, places more emphasis on individuality and the role of the individual will. He views individual freedom as a real force in the world, where individuals can act creatively and bring new realities into existence. This emphasis on individuality and freedom distinguishes Schelling from Spinoza’s more deterministic worldview.

   - **Difference**: Spinoza’s system is more deterministic and views individuality as a mere expression of the divine substance, whereas Schelling gives more importance to individual freedom and creativity as part of the unfolding of the Absolute.

4. **God, Evil, and the Problem of Negativity**:

   - **Spinoza**: Spinoza’s God is completely good and perfect, and the existence of evil is simply a lack of understanding on our part. Since everything follows from the necessary nature of God or Substance, what we perceive as evil is merely a limitation of our perspective.

   - **Schelling**: Schelling’s later philosophy introduces a much more complex understanding of evil and negativity. In *Freedom Essay* and *The Ages of the World*, Schelling argues that evil arises from the dark, irrational ground of existence that precedes the manifestation of the Absolute. This ground contains both good and evil, and thus evil is a real metaphysical possibility within the unfolding of the Absolute.

   - **Difference**: Spinoza does not see evil as a real force but as a lack of understanding, while Schelling sees evil as a fundamental part of existence, rooted in the irrational ground of being itself.

### Summary:

- **Affinities**: Both Spinoza and Schelling share a commitment to monism, an emphasis on the immanence of the divine in nature, and a rejection of traditional dualisms between mind and body, God and the world. They both offer a vision of the unity of all things within a single, overarching principle (Spinoza’s Substance and Schelling’s Absolute).

  

- **Differences**: Spinoza’s philosophy is deterministic and emphasizes intellectual freedom within a fully determined system, while Schelling develops a more dynamic, creative view of the Absolute that includes real freedom and individuality. Spinoza’s God is static and perfect, whereas Schelling’s Absolute includes a dark, irrational ground that allows for both freedom and the emergence of evil. 

Schelling, especially in his later philosophy, breaks away from Spinoza’s strict determinism and offers a more complex, existentially rich view of the world that incorporates freedom, creativity, and negativity.

How did Lacan use the philosophy of Hegel in his own theory? Why didn’t he use Schelling’s philosophy? (ChatGPT, 2024-10-2) (negativity vs vitality) (車行形上學）（metaphysics of van life)

Jacques Lacan’s use of Hegel, particularly the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, plays a crucial role in shaping his psychoanalytic theory, especially in terms of the subject’s development, desire, and recognition. Lacan engages deeply with Hegel's dialectical method, most notably the *master-slave dialectic*, to explore the dynamics of subjectivity, self-consciousness, and desire within psychoanalysis. On the other hand, Schelling’s philosophy receives less attention from Lacan, and there are a few reasons for this divergence.

### How Lacan Used Hegel in His Theory:

1. **The Master-Slave Dialectic and Subject Formation**:

   - Lacan appropriates Hegel's famous master-slave dialectic to explain the process of subject formation through recognition and desire. For Hegel, self-consciousness arises through a struggle for recognition between two consciousnesses. One becomes the master, the other the slave, and through this dynamic, self-consciousness develops. Lacan reinterprets this in psychoanalytic terms, where the subject's desire for recognition is key to understanding identity and self-consciousness.

   - In Lacan’s theory, the subject emerges through a similar dialectic of recognition, not only with others but also through language and the symbolic order. The "Other" in Lacan’s thought is akin to Hegel’s master — it represents the social and symbolic structures that shape the subject and through which the subject seeks recognition.

2. **Desire and the Dialectic**:

   - Lacan famously said, "Man's desire is the desire of the Other," meaning that human desire is shaped by the desire for recognition from the Other (a concept drawn from Hegel's dialectic). Lacan uses this to explain how the subject’s desires are never purely their own but are structured and mediated by the desires of others and by language.

   - Hegel’s dialectical process, where self-consciousness is formed through a series of negations and contradictions, parallels Lacan’s notion of desire as being perpetually unfulfilled and driven by lack. The subject is always seeking something that is ultimately unattainable, leading to a constant movement of desire, much like Hegel’s notion of the dialectic as a movement driven by contradiction.

3. **The Mirror Stage and Hegelian Recognition**:

   - Lacan’s famous concept of the *mirror stage*—where the child identifies with an external image of itself, leading to the formation of the ego—bears Hegelian influences. The child’s recognition of itself in the mirror parallels Hegel’s idea of self-consciousness arising through the recognition of another. However, Lacan emphasizes the misrecognition (*méconnaissance*) inherent in this identification, suggesting that the ego is an illusion shaped by external forces.

   - This misrecognition relates to Hegel’s notion that self-consciousness is always mediated by the other and that the subject is never fully in control of its own identity, a key insight that Lacan deepens in his psychoanalytic work.

4. **Negativity and the Subject**:

   - Hegel’s idea of negativity, where self-consciousness develops through the process of negating what it is not, resonates with Lacan’s theory of the subject. Lacan argues that the subject is defined by a fundamental lack (often symbolized by the "objet petit a"), and this lack or void is what drives desire. For Lacan, the subject is not a unified whole but is split, constantly striving to overcome this lack but never fully achieving it — a process that mirrors Hegel’s dialectical progression through negation and contradiction.

### Why Lacan Didn’t Use Schelling’s Philosophy:

1. **Hegel’s Focus on Subjectivity and Desire**:

   - Hegel's philosophy, especially the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, offers a clear framework for understanding the development of subjectivity, recognition, and desire — all of which are central to Lacan's psychoanalytic project. Lacan saw in Hegel a structure that closely mirrored the processes he was exploring in psychoanalysis, such as the role of the Other, the nature of desire, and the subject's constant negotiation with the symbolic order.

   - Schelling, on the other hand, is more focused on metaphysical and ontological questions, such as the nature of the Absolute and the interplay between freedom and necessity. While these are profound philosophical issues, they do not map as directly onto the psychoanalytic concerns with subjectivity and desire that Lacan was addressing.

2. **Schelling’s Focus on the Unconscious as Metaphysical**:

   - Schelling was one of the earliest philosophers to talk about the unconscious, particularly in his later philosophy, where he explored the unconscious as a metaphysical force underlying existence. However, Schelling’s view of the unconscious was more cosmic and metaphysical, seeing it as part of the dynamic structure of reality itself.

   - Lacan’s focus, by contrast, was on the unconscious as it relates to language, subjectivity, and symbolic structures, drawing heavily on Freud's psychoanalytic framework. While Schelling’s concept of the unconscious was important in the history of ideas, it did not offer the kind of practical, structural insights into the psyche and desire that Hegel’s philosophy did for Lacan’s purposes.

3. **Schelling’s Less Direct Engagement with Language and the Symbolic**:

   - Lacan’s theory is deeply concerned with language and the symbolic order. He argues that the unconscious is structured like a language and that the subject is fundamentally shaped by its immersion in language. Hegel’s dialectical philosophy, with its focus on recognition, negation, and self-consciousness, provided Lacan with tools to think through how language and the symbolic shape subjectivity.

   - Schelling, while a profound thinker, does not engage with language or the symbolic in the way Hegel does. His metaphysical approach to existence, nature, and freedom, while influential in other philosophical contexts, was not as directly useful for Lacan’s focus on the symbolic dimension of psychoanalysis.

### Summary:

Lacan used Hegel’s philosophy, particularly the *master-slave dialectic* and the idea of desire as mediated by the Other, to deepen his psychoanalytic theory. Hegel’s concepts of recognition, negation, and subjectivity provided Lacan with a framework for understanding the dynamics of desire, self-consciousness, and the unconscious. 

Lacan did not focus on Schelling’s philosophy because Schelling’s concerns with metaphysical issues like the Absolute, freedom, and the cosmic unconscious were less relevant to Lacan’s focus on language, desire, and the symbolic structure of the unconscious. Hegel’s dialectical method, with its emphasis on subjectivity and recognition, proved more immediately applicable to the psychoanalytic theory Lacan was developing.

What did Jon Mills talk about Hegel? Why didn’t he talk about Schelling? (ChatGPT, 2024-10-2) (車行形上學）（metaphysics of van life)(negativity vs vitality)

Jon Mills, a contemporary philosopher and psychoanalyst, is known for his work in psychology, psychoanalysis, and philosophy. He has written extensively on Hegel and his relevance to psychoanalysis, particularly in the context of subjectivity, self-consciousness, and the development of the human psyche. Mills often explores how Hegel’s dialectical process can be applied to understanding the development of the self, particularly in the context of psychological theory and the dynamics of the unconscious.

### Mills on Hegel:

1. **Hegel's Influence on Psychoanalysis**: Mills argues that Hegel’s dialectical method, especially the development of self-consciousness through the master-slave dialectic, provides important insights into the formation of the self and subjectivity, which resonate with psychoanalytic theory. Hegel’s ideas of negation, contradiction, and synthesis align with the psychological processes of internal conflict and transformation.

2. **Dialectics and Subjectivity**: Mills uses Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* to explore how the self develops through a series of dialectical movements — from immediate sense-certainty to self-consciousness and eventually to absolute knowing. This movement mirrors the way the psyche encounters and resolves internal conflicts, leading to the development of a cohesive self.

3. **Negativity and Psychic Conflict**: For Mills, Hegel’s notion of negativity, the idea that the self is defined by a constant process of negation and becoming, aligns with psychoanalytic concepts of internal struggle and the process of working through unconscious material. He believes Hegel’s ideas can enhance our understanding of how individuals confront and integrate repressed aspects of the psyche.

### Why Didn’t Jon Mills Talk About Schelling?

While Mills engages extensively with Hegel, Schelling is less central to his work. There could be a few reasons for this:

1. **Psychoanalytic Relevance**: Hegel’s dialectics, particularly the master-slave dynamic and the focus on self-consciousness, seem more directly applicable to psychoanalytic theory than Schelling’s philosophy. Hegel’s focus on the process of becoming, negation, and the development of consciousness through contradiction resonates strongly with psychoanalysis, where the self is seen as a dynamic, conflicted entity.

   In contrast, Schelling’s emphasis on the Absolute and his later metaphysical concerns might be less directly relevant to the psychoanalytic framework Mills works within. Schelling’s ideas, while important in their own right, focus more on the nature of freedom, the unconscious in a metaphysical sense, and the relationship between nature and spirit. These themes, while connected to psychology, don’t directly engage with the process of psychological development in the way Hegel’s dialectical method does.

2. **Hegel's Dominance in Philosophical Discourse**: Hegel’s influence in continental philosophy and psychoanalytic theory is much more prominent compared to Schelling’s, particularly in the 20th century. Thinkers like Jacques Lacan and Slavoj Žižek draw heavily on Hegelian concepts when discussing psychoanalysis, which may explain Mills’s preference for Hegel over Schelling. Hegel's legacy in psychoanalysis makes him a more natural focus for thinkers like Mills who operate within that intellectual tradition.

3. **Schelling’s Philosophical Complexity**: Schelling’s philosophy is notoriously complex and underwent significant shifts over the course of his career, from early idealism to later existential and religious thought. This shifting nature makes it harder to pin down a single cohesive narrative in his thought that can be directly applied to psychoanalytic frameworks in the way Hegel's more structured dialectical approach can.

In summary, Jon Mills focuses on Hegel because Hegel’s dialectics offer a clear framework for understanding the development of the self, subjectivity, and psychic conflict, all of which resonate with psychoanalytic theory. Schelling, while important in his own right, likely doesn’t receive as much attention from Mills because his work doesn’t directly align with the psychoanalytic themes that Mills is interested in exploring.

大禹和柯文哲

司馬遷說，大禹喜戲水，常常不回家，有點像遠洋跑船，動輒數十年，回家卻有一群幼齡兒女，意思是說，我們不確定，不回家的大禹，怎麼生得出啟，但是我們確定，大禹傳位給啟，開啟了中國三千年，家天下惡例，意思是說，大禹以降，以至今日蠢包，害中國沒有民主自由人權法治三千年，大禹對外宣稱治水，柯則對外宣稱治水庫，簡單講，二人都喜玩水，但學科不同，前者是流體力學，後者是加密貨幣洗錢學，

王滬寧公公說笑話

https://youtu.be/fKrSrLtO4fw?si=u7yrObBcZKSEXSZU

黃珊珊招了

https://youtu.be/2WVpAts0KCI?si=O1yWJWWh3nog_fSZ

Banjo Paterson (1864-1941) (車行形上學）（metaphysics of van life)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Banjo_Paterson

bush ballad

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bush_ballad

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_bush#The_Australian_bush

你要理解，他寫的叢林流浪 （Waltzing Matilda）（1895）（31 歲），是澳洲非官方國歌，

我先前說過，三十四十，是我們唯一，有可能原創的十年，我想，這是因為，三十四十，感情豐富，粗具閱歷，體力精神，像出廠五年的車，遂可見到，某個系統的縫隙，

https://zh.wikipedia.org/zh-tw/%E5%8F%A2%E6%9E%97%E6%B5%81%E6%B5%AA_(%E6%BE%B3%E5%A4%A7%E5%88%A9%E4%BA%9E%E6%B0%91%E8%AC%A0)

意思是說，二十世紀初，tramp 曾是有名的逃逸路線，你要理解，逃逸所為何來，正是追尋自由，

自由的定義，就是命運之愛 （amor fati)，但不認命運，又調侃命運，微哂命運，你要理解，戴維斯為自由，曾不惜斷腿，

黃國昌率領華航空姐黃珊珊韓國瑜傅崐萁習近平反攻大陸殺光八千萬共匪解救十四億中國人于水深火熱千古輪迴人間煉獄

https://youtu.be/Hgw0CkEFPLA?si=26ydxCFM0Qo6f_Sb

10/2/24（星期三）(車行形上學）（metaphysics of van life)

What is post-metaphysical thinking? (ChatGPT, 2024-10-2)

Post-metaphysical thinking refers to a philosophical approach that moves away from traditional metaphysical inquiries into the ultimate nature of reality, which typically involve abstract, speculative questions about existence, being, and the nature of the world beyond physical experience. Instead, it emphasizes practical reasoning, linguistic analysis, and the contextual, contingent nature of human understanding. 

This mode of thought emerged largely in response to the critiques of metaphysical philosophy seen in thinkers like Immanuel Kant, Martin Heidegger, and Ludwig Wittgenstein, who questioned whether metaphysical claims could be meaningfully discussed or proven. 

In post-metaphysical thinking, philosophy shifts its focus from questions about transcendent entities or timeless truths to more pragmatic concerns, such as human experience, communication, ethics, and historical contexts. Key proponents include Jürgen Habermas, who emphasizes communicative rationality, and Richard Rorty, who advocates for a more pragmatic, anti-essentialist understanding of philosophy.

Essentially, post-metaphysical thinking sees knowledge and truth as contingent on historical and cultural factors, rather than anchored in timeless metaphysical absolutes.

In other words, post-metaphysical thinking gives up the possibility of transcendence, and advocates immanence?  (ChatGPT, 2024-10-2)

Yes, that's a fair way to put it. Post-metaphysical thinking generally rejects the idea of transcendence in the traditional metaphysical sense — that is, the belief in an ultimate reality or realm that exists beyond or independent of human experience and the material world. Instead, it focuses on immanence, meaning that all meaningful knowledge, values, and understanding are grounded in human experience, language, and the world as we encounter it.

Thinkers within this tradition argue that instead of seeking timeless, universal truths that transcend human existence, we should recognize the historically contingent, socially constructed, and linguistically mediated nature of reality. In this view, there is no need for metaphysical speculation about an ultimate reality beyond what we can engage with practically in our lives. 

For example, Jürgen Habermas advocates for a shift toward communicative rationality, where reason is embedded in social and linguistic practices, rather than seeking abstract, transcendent truths. Similarly, Richard Rorty dismisses metaphysical pursuits in favor of pragmatic approaches that focus on human purposes and practices, emphasizing that knowledge is always shaped by particular contexts and interests.

In this sense, post-metaphysical thinking often aligns with a philosophy of immanence, where meaning and knowledge are embedded within the world we live in, rather than sought in some "beyond."

Can we say that post-metaphysical thinking gives up metaphysical consolation, and becomes a wanderer in the wilderness? (ChatGPT, 2024-10-2)

Yes, that metaphor captures the existential dimension of post-metaphysical thinking quite well. In traditional metaphysics, there is often a sense of "consolation" in the belief that there is a higher, transcendent reality or ultimate truth that gives life meaning or provides a stable foundation for knowledge, ethics, or existence. Such metaphysical frameworks offer a kind of certainty or comfort — whether it's in the form of God, eternal truths, or a cosmic order.

Post-metaphysical thinking, by contrast, relinquishes that metaphysical consolation. It no longer seeks or claims access to a transcendent realm that might offer ultimate answers or meaning. Instead, it recognizes the uncertainty, contingency, and historical situatedness of human life and knowledge. This can indeed feel like becoming "a wanderer in the wilderness" — moving through a world without metaphysical guarantees or secure foundations, constantly navigating the complexities of human existence without the expectation of absolute truths or final resolutions.

This "wandering" is often seen in existentialist and post-structuralist thought, where the lack of metaphysical certainty can lead to a sense of openness, freedom, or even disorientation. Thinkers like Nietzsche, who famously proclaimed the "death of God," embrace this wandering as an opportunity for creativity and self-overcoming. In a similar vein, post-metaphysical thinkers like Rorty and Habermas view the absence of metaphysical foundations as a call to focus on dialogue, contingency, and the continual construction of meaning within human communities.

In this view, the "wilderness" represents both the challenge and the potential of a world where we must find meaning and purpose without the crutch of metaphysical certainties. It’s a philosophy of immanence and perpetual questioning, where humans are responsible for navigating the ethical, political, and existential dilemmas of their time, with no final "home" in transcendence.

Throughout the history of philosophy, which notable philosophers ever had the post-metaphysical impulse?  (ChatGPT, 2024-10-2)

意思是說，車行「形上學」，就是車行「後形上學」，

這些後形上學的衝動的好兄弟，就是車行者（van lifers），

你要理解，與「後形上學的衝動」相對的是，對于「形上學的慰藉」的渴求，

渴，就是行走荒漠，沒有水喝，脫水譫妄，

意思是說，後形上學的衝動，就是譫妄，

你要理解，Artaud 的診斷，就是譫妄，

意思是說，人無症狀不存在，無癮不立，不譫妄，就不成其為藝術，

至此，你終于知道，車行就是流放（exile)，車行者就是流浪漢（hobo，vagabond)，但是 Jack Reacher，船子和尚，洪七公，風清揚，W. H. Davies，George Orwell，豬哥亮，李炳輝，金門王，李文龍，都說過，車行者，是流浪漢，不是無業遊民，不是叫花子 （vagrant)，https://lawyer.get.com.tw/Dic/DictionaryDetail.aspx?sA=V&iDT=81277，只是不願「住」在一個地方 （應無所住而生其心），超過四十八小時 (48 Hrs (1982), Another 48 Hrs (1990))，最多六十一小時 (61 Hours, Lee Child, 2010)，那是冰封大地所致的例外，

Cf. 

William Henry Davies （1871-1940）

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/W._H._Davies

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Autobiography_of_a_Super-Tramp

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/33/SSID-11387559_%E6%B5%81%E6%B5%AA%E8%80%85%E8%87%AA%E5%82%B3.pdf

Works

• The Soul's Destroyer and Other Poems (of the author, The Farmhouse, 1905) (also Alston Rivers, 1907), (Jonathan Cape, 1921)
• New Poems (Elkin Mathews, 1907)
• Nature Poems (Fifield, 1908)
• The Autobiography of a Super-Tramp (Fifield, 1908) (autobiographical)
• How It Feels To Be Out of Work (The English Review, 1 December 1908)
• Beggars (Duckworth, 1909) (autobiographical)
• Farewell to Poesy (Fifield, 1910)
• Songs of Joy and Others (Fifield, 1911)
• A Weak Woman (Duckworth, 1911)
• The True Traveller (Duckworth, 1912) (autobiographical)
• Foliage: Various Poems (Elkin Mathews, 1913)
• Nature (Batsford, 1914) (autobiographical)
• The Bird of Paradise (Methuen, 1914)
• Child Lovers (Fifield, 1916)
• Collected Poems (Fifield, 1916)
• A Poet's Pilgrimage (or A Pilgrimage In Wales) (Melrose, 1918) (autobiographical)
• Forty New Poems (Fifield, 1918)
• Raptures (Beaumont Press, 1918)
• The Song of Life (Fifield, 1920)
• The Captive Lion and Other Poems (Yale University Press, on the Kinglsey Trust Association Publication Fund, 1921)
• Form (ed. Davies and Austin O. Spare, Vol 1, Numbers 1, 2 & 3, 1921/1922)
• The Hour of Magic (illustrated by Sir William Nicholson, Jonathan Cape, 1922)
• Shorter Lyrics of the Twentieth Century, 1900–1922 (ed Davies, Bodley Head, 1922) (anthology)
• True Travellers. A Tramp's Opera in Three Acts (illustrated by Sir William Nicholson, Jonathan Cape, 1923)
• Collected Poems, 1st Series (Jonathan Cape, 1923)
• Collected Poems, 2nd Series (Jonathan Cape, 1923)
• Selected Poems (illustrated with woodcuts by Stephen Bone, Jonathan Cape, 1923)
• 'Poets and Critics' – New Statesman, 21, (8 September 1923)
• What I Gained and Lost By Not Staying at School (Teachers World 29, June 1923)
• Secrets (Jonathan Cape, 1924)
• Moll Flanders, introduction by Davies (Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton, Kent and Co, 1924)
• A Poet's Alphabet (Jonathan Cape, 1925; illustrated by Dora Batty)^[46]
• Later Days (Jonathan Cape, 1925) (autobiographical)
• Augustan Book of Poetry: Thirty Selected Poems (Benn, 1925)
• The Song of Love (Jonathan Cape, 1926)
• The Adventures of Johnny Walker, Tramp (Jonathan Cape, 1926) (autobiographical)
• A Poet's Calendar (Jonathan Cape, 1927)
• Dancing Mad (Jonathan Cape, 1927)
• The Collected Poems of W. H. Davies (Jonathan Cape, 1928)
• Moss and Feather (Faber and Gwyer No. 10 in the Faber Ariel poems pamphlet series, 1928; illustrated by Sir William Nicholson)
• Forty Nine Poems (selected and illustrated by Jacynth Parsons (daughter of Karl Parsons), Medici Society, 1928)
• Selected Poems (arranged by Edward Garnett, introduction by Davies, Gregynog Press, 1928)
• Ambition and Other Poems (Jonathan Cape, 1929)
• Jewels of Song (ed., anthology, Jonathan Cape, 1930)
• In Winter (Fytton Armstrong, 1931; limited edition of 290, illustrated by Edward Carrick; special limited edition of 15 on handmade paper also hand-coloured)
• Poems 1930–31 (illustrated by Elizabeth Montgomery, Jonathan Cape, 1931)
• The Lover's Song Book (Gregynog Press, 1933)
• My Birds (with engravings by Hilda M. Quick, Jonathan Cape, 1933)
• My Garden (with illustrations by Hilda M. Quick, Jonathan Cape, 1933)
• 'Memories' – School, (1 November 1933)
• The Poems of W. H. Davies: A Complete Collection (Jonathan Cape, 1934)
• Love Poems (Jonathan Cape, 1935)
• The Birth of Song (Jonathan Cape, 1936)
• 'Epilogue' to The Romance of the Echoing Wood, (a Welsh tale by W. J. T. Collins, R. H. Johns Ltd, 1937)
• An Anthology of Short Poems (ed., anthology, Jonathan Cape, 1938)
• The Loneliest Mountain (Jonathan Cape, 1939)
• The Poems of W. H. Davies (Jonathan Cape, 1940)
• Common Joys and Other Poems (Faber and Faber, 1941)
• Collected Poems of W. H. Davies (with Introduction by Osbert Sitwell, Jonathan Cape, 1943)
• Complete Poems of W. H. Davies (with preface by Daniel George and introduction by Osbert Sitwell, Jonathan Cape, 1963)
• Young Emma (Jonathan Cape, written 1924, published 1980) (autobiographical)

Notable anthologies

• Collected Poems of W. H. Davies, London: Jonathan Cape, 1940
• B. Waters, ed., The Essential W. H. Davies, London: Jonathan Cape, 1951
• Rory Waterman, ed. and introd., W. H. Davies, the True Traveller: A Reader(Manchester: Fyfield/Carcanet Press, 2015 (accessible via Perlego)

https://muse.jhu.edu/article/367637/pdf

https://www.swansea.ac.uk/media/Leisure---W-H-Davies.pdf

https://www.amazon.com/-/zh_TW/Rory-Waterman-ebook/dp/B08SKGT8XD/ref=sr_1_1?crid=2JK70G8L5OHJ6&dib=eyJ2IjoiMSJ9.dcKVsegm9WYbYaPbI1Tfvg.3SEdQ89Wwoax8xzeJm7QhslFavBOaUe6VJCCBH_TsjA&dib_tag=se&keywords=W.+H.+Davies+Essays+on+the+Super-Tramp+Poet&qid=1727836303&s=books&sprefix=w.+h.+davies+essays+on+the+super-tramp+poet%2Cstripbooks-intl-ship%2C317&sr=1-1

W. H. Davies: Essays on the Super-Tramp Poet (ed. Rory Waterman, 2021) (accessible via Everand)

Leisure (1911)

What is this life if, full of care,
We have no time to stand and stare.

No time to stand beneath the boughs
And stare as long as sheep or cows.

No time to see, when woods we pass,
Where squirrels hide their nuts in grass.

No time to see, in broad daylight,
Streams full of stars, like skies at night.

No time to turn at Beauty's glance,
And watch her feet, how they can dance.

No time to wait till her mouth can
Enrich that smile her eyes began.

A poor life this if, full of care,
We have no time to stand and stare.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leisure_(poem)

Cf. 

Rory Waterman

https://www.amazon.com/stores/Rory-Waterman/author/B00F57AL2A?language=zh_TW&ref=ap_rdr&isDramIntegrated=true&shoppingPortalEnabled=true

https://rorywaterman.com/

Cf. 

Down and Out in Paris and London (George Orwell, 1933)

Cf. 

vagrancy
中文
流浪；流浪罪
解釋
普通法上指游手好閒者能夠以勞動維持生計卻不勞動，沒有固定的住所和經濟收入而依賴他人救濟。流浪本身不是一種具體行為，而是某種身體狀況。這是本罪的一個顯著特點。傳統上，流浪者指靠行乞和偷竊為生的懶人。英國早期普通法中，流浪者可被判處從烙刑、鞭刑到流刑的不同懲罰。後來制定法上將許多不端行為當作流浪處理。在1824年的《流浪法》〔Vagrancy Act〕中將無所事事者〔idle persons〕和妨害治安者〔disorderly persons〕及無賴〔rogues〕、流浪漢〔vagabonds〕和無可救藥者〔incorrigible rogues〕總稱為流浪者並加以區分。但該法後來被修正。美國各州制定法關於流浪罪的規定差異很大，有些制定法規定某一單獨的行為即可構成流浪罪，由於其中規定流浪的概念含糊不清或借此懲罰了許多本不構成犯罪的行為，所以很多關於流浪罪的制定法被認為違憲。

The post-metaphysical impulse in philosophy, while formally emerging in the 20th century, has roots in several earlier philosophers who challenged the traditional metaphysical framework or sought alternatives to metaphysical speculation. Here’s a brief overview of notable philosophers throughout history who exhibited such an impulse:

### 1. **Socrates (470–399 BCE)**

   - **Impulse**: While not fully post-metaphysical, Socrates emphasized practical ethics and human wisdom over speculative metaphysical questions about the universe.

   - **Significance**: Socrates famously declared that he "knew nothing" and focused on questioning assumptions and exploring human virtues rather than seeking metaphysical truths.

### 2. **Immanuel Kant (1724–1804)**

   - **Impulse**: Kant famously critiqued metaphysical speculation in his *Critique of Pure Reason*. He argued that human reason cannot access things "in themselves" (noumena) and must limit its inquiry to phenomena — the world as we experience it.

   - **Significance**: Kant redefined metaphysics by showing that many traditional metaphysical questions (about God, the soul, etc.) were beyond the reach of human knowledge, thus initiating a move away from speculative metaphysics toward a focus on the limits of reason.

### 3. **Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900)**

   - **Impulse**: Nietzsche directly attacked traditional metaphysics, especially the Platonic-Christian idea of transcendent truth. He saw metaphysical systems as life-denying and instead advocated for the affirmation of life and immanence.

   - **Significance**: Nietzsche's critique of metaphysical "truth" and his proclamation of the "death of God" represent a radical break from metaphysics. He focused on power, values, and human creativity as central to human existence, rejecting the need for metaphysical consolation.

### 4. **Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951)**

   - **Impulse**: Wittgenstein, particularly in his later work (*Philosophical Investigations*), abandoned the metaphysical search for the essence of language, meaning, or reality. Instead, he saw philosophy as a tool to clarify language and dissolve confusion, rather than as a means to discover metaphysical truths.

   - **Significance**: Wittgenstein’s idea that philosophy should describe rather than explain, and that meaning is found in use (pragmatic, contextual thinking), contributed to the post-metaphysical impulse.

### 5. **Martin Heidegger (1889–1976)**

   - **Impulse**: Heidegger critiqued traditional metaphysics as a forgetfulness of Being. He sought to "deconstruct" metaphysics and return to more fundamental questions about existence (Being) as experienced in time and history.

   - **Significance**: Though Heidegger developed an alternative ontology, his critique of the metaphysical tradition (especially the focus on beings rather than Being) helped pave the way for post-metaphysical thought.

### 6. **John Dewey (1859–1952)**

   - **Impulse**: Dewey, a pragmatist, rejected metaphysical dualisms (such as mind-body or subject-object) and instead advocated for a focus on human experience and inquiry. He believed philosophy should be practical and rooted in everyday life.

   - **Significance**: Dewey's pragmatism emphasized problem-solving, community, and democracy over metaphysical abstraction, showing a clear post-metaphysical tendency.

### 7. **Jürgen Habermas (1929–)**

   - **Impulse**: Habermas explicitly formulates a "post-metaphysical" project in his philosophy. He shifts away from the metaphysical search for foundational truths to focus on communicative action, ethics, and the social-practical dimension of reason.

   - **Significance**: Habermas argues that we no longer need metaphysical foundations to legitimize norms or knowledge; instead, validity arises through communication and discourse in social contexts.

### 8. **Richard Rorty (1931–2007)**

   - **Impulse**: Rorty was a central figure in articulating a post-metaphysical stance. He rejected the search for objective truth or metaphysical foundations and advocated for a pragmatic philosophy focused on language, contingency, and conversation.

   - **Significance**: Rorty’s anti-essentialism and emphasis on contingency reflect a clear rejection of metaphysics. He viewed philosophy as a tool for achieving solidarity and coping with life, not for discovering ultimate truths.

### 9. **Gilles Deleuze (1925–1995)**

   - **Impulse**: Deleuze critiqued the traditional metaphysical categories of identity, representation, and transcendence, advocating instead for immanence, becoming, and difference. He sought to create a philosophy of flux and multiplicity rather than fixed essences.

   - **Significance**: Deleuze’s philosophy is often read as anti-metaphysical, as he favored a worldview based on immanence and process rather than static, transcendent metaphysical concepts.

### 10. **Michel Foucault (1926–1984)**

   - **Impulse**: Foucault rejected traditional metaphysical concerns in favor of studying the historical and social conditions that shape knowledge, power, and subjectivity. He critiqued the idea of universal, timeless truths.

   - **Significance**: Foucault’s genealogical approach to knowledge focuses on how truth is historically contingent and socially constructed, avoiding metaphysical claims about reality or morality.

### Summary

Throughout the history of philosophy, these thinkers share a common impulse to question, critique, or move beyond traditional metaphysical concerns. Whether through Kant's critique of pure reason, Nietzsche's rejection of metaphysical consolation, or Habermas and Rorty’s focus on practical reasoning and discourse, each contributed to the post-metaphysical turn by challenging the idea that philosophy must seek a transcendent foundation for truth or reality. Instead, they emphasize human experience, communication, and historical context as the ground for philosophical inquiry.

10/1/24（星期二）