1.
話語系統的本質是封閉的
2.
封閉的原因是它預設了所有可能的現象
3. 都已見過都已慮及都可解釋
4. 因此它最不喜歡的就是意外
5.
因為意外破壞了它原本的窗明几淨一塵不染
6.
所以碰到意外它的反應就是把意外硬塞進去原本的系統
7.
或頂多當成特例比如說DSM的NOS (Not Otherwise Specified)
8.
而不是質疑原本信以為真為完美的系統
9.
上述這個封閉性的驅力說明了系統的惰性
10.
也說明了歷史的輪迴
11.
上述的意外是關鍵
12.
Abduction 就是碰到意外的時候發生的
13.
Peirce defines abduction as follows in Baldwin’s Dictionary:
Upon finding himself confronted with a phenomenon unlike what he
would have expected under the circumstances, he looks over its features and
notices some remarkable character or relation among them, which he at once
recognizes as being characteristic of some conception with which the mind is
already stored, so that a theory is suggested which would explain (this is,
render necessary) that which is surprising in the phenomena. (2:427)
Now, how do we find these alternatives? For Peirce it comes down in the end to educated guesses.
This causes some to argue that abduction is not really a mode of inference.
However, something more can be said about these guesses: they typically must take into account as many of the relevant facts as possible; our past experience and other beliefs make some of them more likely than others; each alternative comes with its own presuppositions and implications; some alternatives are far easier to confirm or deny than others; and so on.
Thus, in Kepler’s case, the first guess he should consider is that there are mistakes in the calculations: it’s not unlikely, it’s least invasive in terms of requiring modifications to existing theory or having to dismiss past observations, and it’s relatively easy to check. If no mistakes are found, as happened in Kepler’s case, considerations like the ones listed above, which are largely considerations from the economy of research, will suggest where we should look next.
In contemporary literature, abduction is sometimes referred to as “inference to the best explanation.” This phrase is not used by Peirce and is best avoided because there are several problems with it. Most importantly, this phrase is suited not only for abduction, but also, and perhaps even more so, for induction.
In its most general form abduction can be captured as follows:
Some surprising fact B is observed,
If A were true, B would be explicable as a matter of course;
Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true.
The three types of reasoning outlined above are ideal types, and Peirce considers them the three most basic types of reasoning.
Typically, our reasoning involves combinations of them. A particularly powerful combination—one that is characteristic of much scientific reasoning—combines abduction first with deduction and then with induction.
What sets the train of reasoning in motion, Peirce argues, is some surprising phenomenon that sufficiently compels us to look for an explanation.
In short, abduction furnishes us with explanatory hypotheses, or theories, deduction draws out their logical implications, and induction verifies (or falsifies) these implications, and by doing so verifies (or falsifies) the hypothesis.
de Waal, Cornelis. Peirce: A Guide for the Perplexed (Guides for the Perplexed) (p. 64-66). Bloomsbury Publishing. 2017, Kindle edition.
Now, 我不確定, Peirce上述, 是說明自然科學的邏輯, 還是社會科學或人文學科的邏輯?
前者的研究 可以主客體兩分 控制變相 排除誤差(bias) 就一個自給自足的邏輯系統而言 大家都很高興 我們知道我們在幹甚麼 而且不管做甚麼一定會有結果
後者的探討 無法主客體判然兩分 無法完美控制變相排除誤差 研究者本身的主體性的介入不可避免 而且人的現象和經驗拒絕被定格 往往無法鎖定在明確的範圍內 deduction和induction都有巨大瑕疵 這時abduction成為我們唯一擁有的 極其不完美的邏輯工具
意思是說 用極其不完美的abduction 加上極其不完美的deduction 以至極其不完美的induction 我們極其不完美的面對 極其不完美的人的現象和經驗 大家都很垂頭喪氣 我們不知道我們在幹甚麼 但是知道不管做甚麼 一定不會有結果
這時 你必須想起西西弗斯
