Right now, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) appears to be doing five things simultaneously:
- Rebuilding military capability after the recent U.S.–Israel conflict
- Escalating pressure in the Strait of Hormuz
- Using proxy / covert operations abroad
- Consolidating political power inside Iran
- Preparing for the possibility of renewed war while avoiding total escalation
That combination is important: Iran is acting aggressively enough to preserve deterrence and regime legitimacy, but cautiously enough to avoid regime-ending war.
Here is the situation more concretely.
1. The IRGC is trying to turn the Strait of Hormuz into a controlled zone
This is probably the single biggest strategic development right now.
Iran is no longer speaking about Hormuz merely as an international shipping lane. IRGC officials are redefining it as a much larger “operational area” under Iranian security authority.
Recent developments include:
- threatening or harassing commercial shipping
- demanding coordination with Iranian forces for “safe passage”
- discussing toll systems for ships
- floating ideas of taxing undersea internet cables
- expanding the claimed operational width of Hormuz dramatically
This is not only about oil.
It is about:
- sovereignty,
- chokepoint leverage,
- digital infrastructure,
- insurance costs,
- inflation pressure on the world economy,
- and symbolic postwar survival.
The IRGC seems to believe:
“If we cannot dominate globally, we can still hold the world economy hostage regionally.”
That is classic asymmetric doctrine.
2. Iran is rebuilding deterrence after surviving major strikes
Reports suggest Iran’s military infrastructure was damaged but not destroyed. The IRGC Navy and missile forces are conducting drills and dispersing assets.
At the same time:
- Russia is reportedly helping Iran rebuild drone capability
- the IRGC continues signaling readiness for renewed conflict
- Tehran is testing how much escalation Washington will tolerate
Iran’s strategic message seems to be:
“You hit us hard. But you failed to remove us.”
For the regime, survival itself becomes propaganda.
3. The IRGC is still using proxy and covert networks abroad
The recent arrest of an Iraqi militia commander linked to Iran-backed networks is significant. U.S. authorities accuse him of coordinating attacks across Europe and North America.
Whether every allegation is correct or not, the broader pattern fits long-standing IRGC/Quds Force doctrine:
- plausible deniability
- disposable intermediaries
- hybrid warfare
- low-cost intimidation
- proxy networks instead of direct confrontation
This is why many Gulf states remain deeply anxious about Iranian influence even during ceasefires.
Bahrain’s arrests of alleged IRGC-linked operatives also fit this pattern.
4. Inside Iran, the IRGC may be becoming even more powerful than the clerical state
A recurring analysis now is that the IRGC is evolving from:
“guardian of the revolution”
into
“the revolution itself.”
Some analysts argue the Supreme Leader’s symbolic authority increasingly depends on IRGC backing rather than the reverse.
In practical terms, the IRGC already controls:
- major industries
- ports
- logistics
- sanctions evasion
- missile programs
- proxy warfare
- internal security
- intelligence networks
War conditions usually strengthen organizations like this.
Historically, wars often create:
- praetorian states,
- military-commercial complexes,
- and permanent emergency systems.
Iran may be drifting further in that direction.
5. Iran is balancing between resistance and exhaustion
Iran also appears deeply strained.
There are signs of:
- economic stress
- internet shutdowns and information control
- internal repression
- infrastructure strain
- concern about regime stability
This creates an important paradox:
The regime must look defiant externally,
while preventing internal exhaustion from becoming destabilizing.
So Tehran’s current behavior often looks like:
- calibrated brinkmanship,
- controlled chaos,
- symbolic escalation,
- but avoidance of full-scale direct war.
Your earlier intuition about “system behind system behind system” (Kafkaesque layering) actually fits the IRGC phenomenon unusually well.
Because the IRGC is not merely:
- a military,
- or intelligence service,
- or economic actor,
- or ideological institution.
It is all of them simultaneously.
Which means:
to understand modern Iran,
one almost has to see the IRGC as a kind of:
state-within-the-state,
economy-within-the-economy,
and narrative-machine-within-the-regime.
Or perhaps more precisely:
an adaptive survival organism born from permanent siege conditions.
That is why it is simultaneously resilient, paranoid, improvisational, ideological, and opportunistic.
From Gemini (2026-5-16)
- Strait of Hormuz Restriction: The IRGC has instituted a restrictive transit system over the Strait of Hormuz, asserting that while the gateway remains open to neutral and friendly countries, it is closed to designated adversaries. Transiting vessels must coordinate directly with the IRGC navy.
- Submarine Deployment: The IRGC has deployed Ghadir-class midget submarines on active patrol lines in the narrow, shallow waters of the Strait of Hormuz to establish stealth naval coverage against U.S. warships.
- Threats to Bab el-Mandeb: Intelligence and state-linked media indicate that Iran and Houthi forces are actively coordinating plans to block the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. This move aims to establish a "second front" to trigger global energy shortages and pressure Washington. [1, 2, 3, 4]
- Sidelining the Presidency: The IRGC has effectively stripped power from civilian President Masoud Pezeshkian, operating military campaigns and regional policy behind his back.
- The "Military Council": Senior IRGC commanders have formed a de facto "military council" that controls core national decision-making. They have established a strict security cordon around Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, heavily restricting government access to him.
- Sabotaging Diplomacy: While diplomatic teams participate in external mediation, the IRGC is heavily influencing or outright disrupting formal peace negotiations regarding the broader conflict. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7]
- Infiltration and Networks: Regional neighbors are aggressively cracking down on IRGC cells. Al Jazeera reports that Bahrain and the UAE have recently arrested dozens of individuals accused of pledging allegiance to Iran-linked networks.
- Kuwait Border Tensions: Kuwait reported foiling an infiltration and naval operation conducted by the IRGC along its maritime borders.
- Fragile Ceasefire Enforcements: A temporary, U.S.-Iran two-week ceasefire brokered by Pakistan remains volatile. Despite the truce, localized skirmishes between IRGC naval forces and Western/regional allies continue to break out across the Gulf. [1, 2, 3, 4]
- Oil Crisis: Due to an intense U.S. naval blockade around Kharg Island, Iran's primary crude export hub has faced massive disruptions. Onshore storage facilities have become so overwhelmed that oil has begun leaking into the Persian Gulf, devastating local production capacity.
- Domestic Recovery: The country is facing deep infrastructural crises following months of heightened conflict, suffering from worsening nationwide power shortages and severely strained business continuity. Domestic airports in Tehran have only recently reopened on a highly restricted basis. [1, 2, 3, 4]
