Firstly he contends that the contemporary Kleinians remain ‘objectivist’ or ‘realist’ in their phenomenology, as if operating as independent observers. Schafer goes on to contend that they have not yet described a coherent position on many matters of importance, such as the distinction between the self and the ego. Thirdly, he questions their de-emphasising reconstruction.
Stern, J. (1998). The Contemporary Kleinians of London. Edited by Roy Schafer. Madison: International Universities Press. $65.00, £62.00. Pp. ix + 442.. Psychoanal. Psychother., 12(1):75-79
see also
V Critical
Remarks
I come now to some concluding
observations, suggestions, and criticisms of the work I have been sketching.
Like what has come before, however, these concluding remarks are hardly more
than signposts of important problems to be confronted in relation to these
Kleinian advances in clinical work.
1. These Kleinians remain
objectivist or realist in their phenomenology.
They consistently present their
material as though they are in the position of purely independent
observers—even of their own countertransferences.
To
my mind, this is contrary to what one might expect from the object-relational
point of view. That point of
view would seem inherently to favor a dialogic rather than objectivist idea of the
material being analyzed; by "dialogic" I mean put into words and developed jointly by
analysand and analyst in their
interchanges (Schafer, 1992).
They, however, maintain a steadily factual or
realist tone throughout their writings; they "discover"
rather than "coauthor." In this respect, they do not differ from standard Freudians.
Neither group does
much to acknowledge divergent points of
view, that is, to practice what I call comparative analysis (Schafer, 1985).
2. As I see it, these
Kleinians have not adequately developed a position on matters of importance
in standard Freudian structural and functional
theory.
For example, beyond some dynamic propositions, they do not concern themselves sufficiently
with such key questions as
what enables their analysands to answer with more or less stable understanding to interpretations. I have
tried to show that they do put a lot of emphasis on the
motives, mechanisms, and fantasies that interfere with the reception and
understanding of what the analyst imparts to them.
But because their
paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions are presented as
all-encompassing, even if with adaptive potential, there is no
well-developed theoretical provision for what standard Freudians call the
observing ego and the ego's synthesizing function, that is, the analyst's structurally and
functionally stable and intact collaborator and dialogical
partner in the process.
In this connection, the Kleinians do not
draw systematic distinctions between self concepts and ego
concepts; using them rather interchangeably, they speak comfortably
about attacks on the ego, the self, even the mind, in a way that
refers in part to actual functional disturbances and in part to
unconscious fantasies of the ego, self, or mind being a substance that can be ejected, spoiled, or
broken into pieces.
The concretistic fantasy of
mind is not foreign to any analyst who works on primitive levels of
function, but fantasy is not systematic theory, and primitive
dynamics cannot account adequately for secondary process communication and organization.
Although it can therefore be argued
that significant aspects of their work is undertheorized, it is not at all
clear that at this stage of creative endeavor comprehensive
systematization should be emphasized; the model set by Heinz Hartmann (1964) is, in general, no longer
a major influence in psychoanalysis.
Also, variations of function can be taken up in terms of fantasy,
too.
3. More and more, these Kleinian
Freudians de-emphasize reconstruction. Going further, I
would say that they seem to deemphasize causal explanations of any sort.
Not
that they scrupulously avoid these formulations or condemn
them, but primarily they remain intent on developing explicitly the
phenomenology of the internal world and the way it is played out
in relations with the external world.
They fear that otherwise they
might interpret before they truly understand, and this, I would say,
is a well-taken caution. One sign of this shift of emphasis away from
explanation is that, in their case presentations, they do not develop
accounts that warrant the designation "life
histories."
Typically, the examples of work they present are in midstream,
and we do not get much of an account of the preceding analytic process and its
place in overall history.
Thus, they seem to follow the guidelines laid down by
Bion (1967): to approach each session so far as possible
"without memory or desire." I believe that this restricted emphasis
on the present, technically and interpretively, pushes other aspects of the
analytic context out of sight and leaves their readers with too many unanswered
questions.
Further to this point, I
believe that Bion's advice makes a good deal of sense so long as it is
not examined too closely; in his own way, Freud had already recommended the same basic
approach when encouraging bending one's
own unconscious to the patient's. More closely examined,
however, the advice clearly misrepresents the mind of any analyst working with an analysand
about whom a good deal has already been
formulated and in relation to whom a good deal has already been
experienced. And this is not yet to speak of theoretical orientation and therapeutic aims, however
well regulated they may be. Nor is it to speak of all those benign and
malignant countertransferential aims that require constant monitoring. Finally,
thinking causally and retrospectively is probably impossible to suspend
altogether; certainly, this is so for the short term, and probably it is
indispensable in organizing any significant intervention, however
phenomenologically cast it may be.
4. Characteristically, these
Kleinians view their analysands, including those who diagnostically would not
be put in any seriously disturbed group, as struggling with many
unresolved primitive issues associated with the
paranoid-schizoid and early depressive positions.
By implication, then, it
is as if the analysands are struggling with problems that date
from their earliest years.
Consequently, the prototypical
objects they refer to in their interpretations tend to be the
mother of unconscious fantasy with her baby or toddler though sometimes
also an undifferentiated parental couple.
Similarly, the prototypical
issues and modes of relationship tend to center around primitive
experiences of pain, goodness and badness, anxiety, dependency, loss,
abandonment, and the like.
In the current life details in their
published process notes, however,their analysands often come across much
like those presented in papers written by members of other schools
of psychoanalytic thought.
That is to say, the analysands are often
preoccupied with their sexual relationships, usually heterosexual
desire, love and its frustrations, and sometimes with similar
homosexual issues. Triangulations, ambitions, and feelings of
inadequacy, damagedness, and undesirability are also common.
But
the Kleinian analyst's interventions tend to reduce this
material rather quickly to what the
standard Freudians would call the
pregenital or preoedipal levels of experience and organization.
Consequently, there is precious little
development of the analysis of
conventionally oedipal sexual conflict in and of itself. Although,
in working through problems of
the paranoidschizoid and depressive
positions, the analyst may take note of the analysand's developing a
reliable capacity for love and concern and a readiness for sexual
gratification, and although he or she may refer to an early form of the oedipus
complex, that analyst may still treat genital matters much as the manifest
content of a dream should be treated, that is, primarily as a
pathway to unconsciously dyadic issues.
On their part, however, contemporary
Freudians have been paying much more attention to the preoedipal or
pregenital, dyadic foundations of
the oedipus complex and its
disturbances. They also keep a sharp eye out for signs of early oedipal
developments as well as disruptions of early ego and
superego development and the stable and constant object relations that
should be beginning to evolve. In this, they move closer to the
Kleinians. Rather characteristically,
however, they seem to me to try to
work with both dynamic levels, that is, to maintain an optimally flexible position with
regard to the dynamic level most appropriate to
take up at any given time. In any event, they would not be so quickly
reductive as the Kleinians, which is to say that they would not
be so quick to view conventional sexuality with suspicion as probably being
emphasized for defensive
purposes in order to avoid the
larger issues appropriate to the paranoid-schizoid and depressive
positions. Consequently, in my
view, the standard Freudian
phenomenology and patterning of sexual experience is more developed even if
not always appropriately applied and even if still, and far
too often, quite limited in its departure from a narrow oedipal
approach.
How does this Kleinian focus on the
primitive tie in with these Kleinians' de-emphasis of
reconstruction? Much of their argument seems to depend on the idea that
accounts of the past or of events outside the consulting room, even
those in the immediate present, are
unreliable. These accounts are not
necessarily false; rather, patients are probably presenting them as
props in order to develop an emotional position vis-à-vis the analyst.
Consequently, one cannot be sure of having a rounded or
balanced or comprehensive picture or what, in ordinary terms, would be
accepted as the actual life history or the actual present life situation
or even a specific other person. I believe that there is much to recommend this
policy of suspicion or suspended judgment. Remaining with this moment-to-moment
work is essential in the opening up of significant themes and the establishment
of communication that resonates with the deep emotional experiences of hitherto inaccessible analysands. I believe that
standard Freudians in general take a similar view of
the unreliability or undecidability of "case history"
material, and yet in their published reports they often seem to forget their appropriate reservations in
this regard.
5. Finally, taken in its entirety,
we can see that this Kleinian approach is so centered on the dynamic present,
and on issues of relatedness and the many forms of dialogue, that it
allows these Kleinians much narrative freedom in writing up
their cases for publication.
We can tell that this is so from the titles
of many of their papers. In Betty Joseph's work, for example, we find
such titles as "The Patient Who Is Difficult To Reach,"
"Addiction to Near-Death," "On Understanding and Not
Understanding." Other titles from this group of workers emphasize resonance, reassurance, retreats,
enclaves, and so on.
This narrative freedom
becomes most evident within the bodies of Kleinian Freudian papers where the
theme announced in the title becomes and remains an
organizing principle. On their part, standard Freudians no longer
systematically avoid colorful experiential titles, but usually
they practice more reserve in the body of their papers, as though to
demonstrate that they are scientifically sound and safely neutral. Consequently, and as an extra
bonus, these Kleinian Freudians are, I think,
usually more engaging writers, and, in this stage of the evolution of
psychoanalysis, they can have a liberating and invigorating effect
on the reader as well as helping him or her work with patients with
greater acuity and depth.
Schafer, R. (1994). The Contemporary Kleinians of London. Psychoanal. Q., 63:409-432
