S12 的最重要的問題，對于在台灣講解殖而言，那就是，如何解文化中國的殖？ (S12) (1140823) (ChatGPT, 2025-8-19) (自體的心理學)（車行哲學）

To help address this deeply significant question for your S12 seminar, could you please clarify the following:

1. Are you asking for a theoretical response (e.g., from decolonial theory, psychoanalysis, cultural studies), or more practical/clinical strategies (e.g., how therapists or educators in Taiwan might respond)?
2. Should this focus on historical-cultural analysis (e.g., Confucian legacy, diaspora, Sinophone identity), or on contemporary geopolitics (e.g., cross-strait relations, PRC influence)?
3. Do you want references from Taiwan-based scholars or global perspectives as well?

Once I understand the angle you’d like to explore, I can begin research or help develop a handout to support your seminar.

My angle is that 關於台灣的主體性的打造，這個解殖（解文化中國的殖） 是關鍵難題，（ChatGPT, 2025-8-19)

Understood. I’ll begin researching how Taiwanese intellectuals, activists, and psycho-cultural theorists have approached the challenge of decolonizing from ‘cultural China’—as a core tension in the construction of Taiwanese subjectivity.

I’ll pay special attention to:

• Key theoretical debates around Taiwan’s subjectivity vis-à-vis Confucianism, Sinophone identity, and Chinese imperial residue.
• Postcolonial and decolonial strategies proposed in Taiwan to challenge cultural China as a colonizing structure.
• Perspectives from psychoanalysis, cultural studies, and indigenous politics.

I’ll let you know once the summary and references are ready for your S12 seminar.

Decolonizing “Cultural China” in Taiwanese Subjectivity

Historical and Ideological Legacy of “Cultural China” in Taiwan

• Chinese National Narratives as Colonial Imposition: After 1945, the KMT regime subsumed Taiwan’s history and identity under a Sino-centric narrative. Official policy framed Taiwan’s retrocession as a “return” to China, erasing Taiwan’s distinct colonial past . In practice, the Republic of China (ROC) treated Taiwan as a province of an eternal China, suppressing local history in favor of Chinese history and ideology . This cultural colonization meant that a Chinese historical view replaced local perspectives, Mandarin was enforced as the national (colonial) language at the expense of Taiwanese languages, and “Chineseness” was privileged as superior while “Taiwaneseness” was stigmatized as inferior . Such policies constructed an internal hierarchy that legitimized the ruling KMT elites and treated Chinese culture as the high-status norm, all while marginalizing native Taiwanese culture .
• Confucian Tradition as Cultural Hegemony: A key aspect of “cultural China” in Taiwan was the elevation of Confucianism and orthodox Chinese traditions as markers of national identity. During the Cold War era, the KMT launched a “Chinese Cultural Renaissance” to counter communism, effectively installing Confucian ethics and rituals at the center of public culture and education. Confucianism, laden with “Chinese-ness,” attained hegemonic status in Taiwan – to the point of functioning like a state religion under KMT rule . National ceremonies and school curricula exalted Confucius and Chinese classics, reinforcing the idea that to be Taiwanese was to inherit an unbroken Confucian-Chinese civilization. Decolonial critics note that this deployment of Confucian tradition served to legitimize Chinese dominance, and they argue for critically interrogating or localizing such traditions rather than uncritically accepting them as the essence of Taiwanese culture .
• One China Ideology vs. Taiwanese Subjectivity: The very ideal of a singular Chinese nation (the “One China” principle) has functioned as an ideological colonizer, denying a Taiwanese national consciousness. Both the PRC and ROC long suppressed the notion of a Taiwanese nation, insisting that Taiwan is an integral part of China. Decolonial historians point out that labeling Qing and KMT rule in Taiwan as “legitimate Chinese governance” (rather than colonial) is a sleight of hand that obscures the exploitative, settler-colonial nature of those regimes . For example, Qing imperial annexation (1683–1895) and the KMT’s post-1945 takeover were not traditionally taught as “colonization,” whereas Japanese rule was – an asymmetry that served Chinese nationalist narratives . Today, Taiwanese scholars and activists explicitly term the KMT’s 1945–1987 rule a form of colonization, emphasizing events like the 1947 February 28 Massacre as evidence of brutal occupation . Recognizing these historical truths has been crucial in building a Taiwanese subjectivity separate from the “One China” framework. As historian Wu Rwei-Ren argues, Taiwan’s experience of serial colonizations (Qing, Japanese, KMT) followed by democratization makes it a “fragment of empires” – a place whose very identity has been shaped by resisting and surviving imperial claims . This perspective reframes Taiwanese history as one of oppression by “cultural China” rather than seamless belonging to it.

Postcolonial Theory and Multiple Colonialisms

• Taiwan as Both Colonial and Postcolonial: Postcolonial theorists in Taiwan stress that the island’s condition defies simple labels – it is simultaneously colonial and postcolonial, having been colonized by multiple powers and yet forging a modern identity of its own . Wu Rwei-Ren, a leading public intellectual, highlights a “parallax” view of history: from the perspective of Indigenous Austronesians, Han Chinese settlers were the first colonizers; from the Hoklo (Minnan) Taiwanese perspective, the arriving KMT mainlanders in the 1940s were colonizers; and from the mainland KMT’s perspective, Japan was the colonizer . These overlapping layers mean Taiwan does not fit neatly into a single postcolonial narrative – it exhibits traits of a colony and a postcolony at the same time. Wu’s scholarship (e.g. Prometheus Unbound: When Formosa Reclaims the World) portrays Taiwan as “historically oppressed and colonized in multiple ways,” yet also possessing an incomplete, emerging nationhood . This has inspired a Left Taiwanese nationalism that is anti-colonial but also self-reflexive, acknowledging that notions like “400 years of Taiwanese history” are themselves modern constructions . Crucially, Wu’s approach rejects any primordialist claims – Taiwanese identity is seen as a product of history and struggle, not an essence – which contrasts with PRC narratives of an eternal Chinese motherland .
• Critiques of Sinocentrism and Nativism: Scholars such as Chen Kuan-Hsing have applied postcolonial critique to both Western and Chinese hegemonies. In Asia as Method: Toward Deimperialization, Chen argues that Taiwan (and Asia at large) must decenter all imperial structures – Euro-American dominance as well as internalized Sinocentrism . He notes that Cold War ideologies installed a deep “anti-communist, pro-American” structure in Taiwan’s psyche, but also that Chinese cultural nationalism became another dominating force . Importantly, Chen warns against replacing one hegemony with another: a decolonization that merely flips to rigid nativist nationalism can become another trap . He calls for “rethinking the question of colonial subjectivity” beyond the old binaries, urging an approach that avoids the pitfalls of both narrow anti-colonial nativism and uncritical globalism . In practice, this means acknowledging the hybridity of Taiwanese culture and engaging in “critical syncretism.” For example, Chen retools a late-Ming critique of Neo-Confucian orthodoxy (Edward T. Ch’ien’s notion of syncretism) as a method for today’s culture: actively interiorizing diverse elements into one’s own subjectivity to transcend identities dictated by colonial power relations . This theoretical move exemplifies how Confucian cultural heritage might be re-appropriated critically rather than simply rejected or glorified.
• Settler Colonialism Discourse: Another postcolonial angle in Taiwan studies is the examination of settler colonialism. Scholars note that Han Chinese migration to Taiwan (from the 17th century onward) constituted a settler takeover of indigenous lands, a process later compounded by Japanese and KMT settler regimes . By viewing Chinese presence itself as one wave of colonization, these theorists unsettle the narrative of cultural China as benign “heritage.” Instead, terms like “internal colonization” or “re-colonization” are used to describe the KMT’s rule – highlighting that after Japanese colonialism ended, a new colonizer arrived in the form of the ROC government . This perspective aligns with global settler colonial studies and forces a reckoning with Han privilege in Taiwan’s history. It has also led to comparisons between Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Okinawa as places facing both external imperialism and the legacy of Chinese/Han settler domination . Overall, postcolonial debates in Taiwan emphasize complexity over purity – arguing that Taiwanese subjectivity must be forged through confronting all layers of colonization (Japanese, Chinese, Western) and negotiating a multicultural, inclusive identity rather than reverting to any singular cultural essence. As Chen Kuan-Hsing puts it, decolonization requires self-reflexivity: without vigilance, “Sinocentrism would once again cause China (and Chinese-identifying elites) to ignore the rest of the world”, repeating imperial patterns . Thus, Taiwanese theorists seek a new imagination beyond China-versus-West binaries, aiming for an Inter-Asian and oceanic framework that places Taiwan in a dynamic, decolonized regional context .

Psychoanalytic and Affective Dimensions of (Dis)Identification

• Internalized Colonizer and Psychic Trauma: The colonization of Taiwan by “cultural China” has not only political or historical effects, but also deep psychological and affective impacts on the colonized subject. A vivid example is given by Chen Kuan-Hsing, who recounts his own mother’s experience during the Cold War: she developed schizophrenia, and such was her indoctrinated loyalty that she set aside a bowl of rice at every meal for the invisible “Father Chiang” (Chiang Kai-shek) and swore never to return to her native Beijing while it was under communist rule . This poignant anecdote illustrates how ideology can inhabit the psyche, creating a colonized mindset wherein Chiang (the KMT leader) figured as an almost paternal symbolic presence. Moreover, the divide between mainlander (waishengren) and native Taiwanese (benshengren) communities in that era produced what Chen describes as “two structures of sentiment” that never intersected . In other words, each group lived in separate affective worlds – mainland exiles clinging emotionally to a lost Chinese motherland, and local Taiwanese nursing resentment and memories of KMT brutality – with little mutual understanding. Chen argues that any true reconciliation or “truce” between Taiwan and China (and between Taiwan’s internal ethnic groups) must address these emotional and psychic terrains rather than only legal or economic issues . This psychoanalytic insight – that colonial power operates through the intimate realm of feelings, dreams, and subconscious identifications – has become a crucial part of Taiwanese decolonization discourse.
• Affective Disidentification: As a response to decades of enforced Chineseness, many Taiwanese have undergone what might be called affective disidentification with “China.” This refers to the emotional process of unlearning attachments to the colonizer’s identity and withdrawing the libidinal investment in the idea of a greater Chinese nation. For older generations of waishengren, identifying as Chinese was once a source of pride or even a survival strategy, but for younger generations today, the term “Chinese” often evokes an other to be distanced from. Surveys in recent years show a marked decline in the number of people in Taiwan who feel “Chinese” – a psychological shift correlating with PRC aggression and a strengthened local identity . Cultural theorists have drawn on psychoanalytic concepts like identification and denial to explain this shift: colonial subjects initially may identify with the aggressor (adopting the colonizer’s culture, language, and worldview), but over time – especially as the promise of that identification falters – they may disidentify, finding the colonizer’s image within themselves to be alien. In Taiwan’s context, this can be seen in phenomena like youths rejecting the worship of KMT martyrs, satirizing symbols of Chinese nationalism, or publicly embracing a Taiwanese cultural persona that pointedly excludes China.
• Memory and Trauma: The affective dimension is also evident in collective memory and trauma. The February 28, 1947 Massacre and the White Terror that followed left deep wounds – generations of Taiwanese grew up in fear, learned to self-censor, or harbored hidden grief. Part of decolonizing cultural China has meant surfacing these suppressed memories and treating them as foundational to Taiwanese subjectivity. For instance, works of literature and film (e.g. Hou Hsiao-hsien’s “City of Sadness” or Wuhe’s novel “Remains of Life”) perform a kind of cultural psychoanalysis, bringing repressed traumas of Chinese/KMT colonization to consciousness. In psychoanalytic terms, Taiwan’s post-authoritarian society has been working through a “postcolonial melancholia” – the lingering sense of loss, injustice, and identity confusion caused by having one’s history denied or appropriated. Scholars in cultural studies note that breaking the spell of “cultural China” involves creating new affective attachments: love of local land and languages, pride in Taiwan’s democratic struggles, and even identification with Indigenous or Austronesian roots as an alternative symbolic ancestry (a notable trend discussed below) . Through art, ritual (such as replacing Chiang Kai-shek statues with native symbols), and public discourse, Taiwanese society is actively re-narrating the emotional story it tells itself – shifting from a narrative of Chinese nostalgia or KMT paternalism to one of Taiwan-centered empathy and solidarity. This reorientation of feeling is as important as formal political changes in consolidating a decolonized identity.

Language Politics and the Sinophone Turn

• Mandarin vs. Mother Tongues: Language has been a central battleground in challenging “cultural China.” During KMT rule, Mandarin Chinese was enforced as the sole official language, while Taiwanese Hokkien (Minnan), Hakka, and indigenous Austronesian languages were discouraged or banned in schools and media. This linguistic imperialism aimed to mold Taiwanese people into cultural Chinese subjects loyal to the ROC. Decolonization efforts, therefore, have placed heavy emphasis on reviving and valorizing local languages. Since the 1990s, we have seen a Taiwanese (Minnan) language renaissance – pop music, theater, and literature increasingly use Taiwanese dialect, asserting it as a legitimate medium of modern culture. Hakka language preservation programs and the official recognition of indigenous languages (with a 2017 law granting them national language status) further exemplify this push. The goal is not to eradicate Mandarin, but to end its monopoly and hegemonic status. As one commentator put it, the project of cultural Taiwanization must “remove the hegemonic nature of Chineseness” in domains like historiography, language, and the arts, leveling the playing field for local languages and traditions to flourish on equal terms . By dethroning Mandarin and re-centering multilingualism, Taiwan undermines the notion that it is merely a branch of the Chinese cultural tree.
• Sinophone Studies – Decentering “China”: In academic and literary circles, the development of Sinophone studies has been a strategic move to decolonize the concept of Chinese culture. Coined by scholars like Shu-mei Shih, “Sinophone” refers to Sinitic-language cultures and communities outside the Chinese mainland or on the cultural margins. It explicitly challenges the idea of a single, unifying Chinese culture emanating from Beijing. Shu-mei Shih argues that the Sinophone framework serves to critique the hegemonic homogeneity of “Chineseness” . In her manifesto Against Diaspora, Shih notes that traditional diaspora studies centered everything on the motherland, whereas Sinophone studies treats places like Taiwan, Hong Kong, Malaysia, or diaspora communities as centers of cultural production in their own right . Practically, this means Taiwanese literature and art in Chinese language are studied not as subordinate subsets of “Chinese literature,” but as Sinophone Taiwanese literature with its own history and context. The Sinophone approach also includes works by minority peoples within China (Tibetans, Uyghurs, etc. writing in Chinese) and by the Chinese diaspora, highlighting heterogeneity. In Taiwan, scholars such as Chiu Kuei-Fen have been at the forefront of Sinophone and transnational literary studies. Chiu and others have demonstrated, for example, how Taiwanese writers under Japanese rule (1895–1945) were already producing unique local modernisms, and how postwar authors navigated multiple linguistic influences to create a distinct voice . By positioning Taiwan as part of a “Global Sinosphere” rather than a unit of a Greater China, Sinophone studies provides a theoretical basis for cultural decolonization. It asserts that one can write in Chinese (or use Chinese cultural references) and still emphatically not be participating in a Chinese nationalist project. This intellectual move has empowered many Taiwanese (and other Sinophone communities) to embrace hybrid identities without defaulting to PRC-centric definitions.
• Language and Identity Movements: On the ground, language activism continues to shape Taiwanese subjectivity. Bilingual signage and education reforms reflect a new linguistic landscape: indigenous place names are being restored alongside Chinese names, and schools teach basic phrases in Austronesian tongues and Hakka, instilling respect for non-Mandarin heritage. Meanwhile, debates over scripts have symbolic resonance – for instance, proposals to use simplified Chinese characters (as used in the PRC) in Taiwan for convenience have been met with resistance, because traditional characters are seen as part of Taiwan’s cultural distinctiveness (and also a link to a pre-PRC Chinese heritage that Taiwan “conserved”). These debates underscore that even orthography can carry political weight: the choice of script, dialect, or romanization can signify alignment with or defiance against cultural China . Another notable development is the rise of a new generation of writers and filmmakers who code-switch or write in multiple languages, reflecting Taiwan’s pluralism. For example, novelist Wu Ming-yi mixes Mandarin, Japanese, and indigenous words in his work; hip-hop artists rap in Taiwanese Hoklo; indigenous filmmakers use tribal languages with Chinese subtitles. This creative multilingualism is a conscious rejoinder to the previously monolithic “Chinese” cultural narrative. In sum, Taiwan’s language politics – from official policies to artistic expression – illustrate a broad strategy of linguistic decolonization, aligning with the view that “national language” should no longer mean only Mandarin, but a family of languages that together anchor a unique Taiwanese cultural identity .

Confucianism and National Identity Construction

• Reassessing the Confucian Heritage: Because Confucian thought is so closely identified with traditional Chinese culture, it occupies an ambivalent place in Taiwanese decolonization discourse. On one hand, the KMT regime’s heavy promotion of Confucian morals (filial piety, loyalty, harmony) is now understood as part of the ideological apparatus that legitimized authoritarian rule and a Chinese identity. Decolonizing cultural China thus calls for demystifying Confucianism’s role. Critics point out that KMT elites selectively elevated Confucian symbols – for example, making Confucius’s birthday a national holiday (Teachers’ Day) and erecting Confucius temples – to assert their cultural authority. This created a hierarchy where Confucian “orthodoxy” was treated as high culture, while local folk beliefs or indigenous spiritual traditions were deemed inferior . Postcolonial scholars have interrogated this hierarchy, asking whose purposes it served. They note that Confucian discourse in the ROC often reinforced patriarchal and hierarchical values useful to a top-down regime (e.g. obedience to authority). Therefore, some Taiwanese intellectuals advocate “de-Confucianizing” the public sphere – or at least reducing Confucianism from a state-imposed canon to one cultural resource among many. This doesn’t necessarily mean rejecting Confucian heritage outright, but rather “decentering” it from its hegemonic position so that Taiwanese cultural identity is not defined solely by Confucian-Chinese terms . For instance, in school curricula and civic events today, we see a broader inclusion of Taiwan’s multicultural elements (aboriginal ceremonies, democratic ideals, etc.) alongside or instead of the old Confucian rituals.
• Critical Syncretism – Integrating Traditions Without Hegemony: Some theorists propose constructive ways to engage Confucian and Chinese traditions in a decolonized framework. Chen Kuan-Hsing’s idea of critical syncretism is one example: he revives a concept from late Ming thinkers who critiqued rigid Neo-Confucian dogma, and adapts it as a strategy for cultural identification in the present . The idea is that Taiwanese (and other formerly colonized peoples) can selectively “interiorize elements of others into the self” – meaning they can absorb aspects of Chinese, Japanese, Western, or other cultures, but on their own terms, without those elements becoming hegemonic. In practice, this might look like embracing certain Confucian values (say, the emphasis on education or family) as part of Taiwanese culture, while stripping them of the notion that they are “Chinese” and supreme. It aligns with what some call a “localized Confucianism”, evident in how Taiwan’s democratic society has at times blended Confucian ethics (community, consensus-building) with modern civil rights. Another example is the reinterpretation of minjian (民間, “popular” or “civil”) Confucian practices through a democratic lens – turning what was once elite orthodoxy into a grassroots, pluralistic ethic . The broader point is that decolonization does not require a purist rejection of anything deemed “Chinese.” Instead, it seeks to end the colonizing power of those cultural elements. As one commentator put it, “cultural decolonization is about overturning Chineseness as the supreme symbol of the state,” not about abolishing Chinese culture per se . In essence, Confucian and other Chinese traditions can be reclaimed or shared as one part of Taiwan’s diverse heritage, once they are disarmed of their hegemonic status . This vision resonates with the idea of Taiwan as a culturally hybrid society – one that can carry influences from China, Japan, Southeast Asia, and indigenous sources, without being subsumed by any single one.
• Confucianism in Contemporary Debates: The Confucian legacy still sparks lively debate among Taiwanese intellectuals. Public figures on the pro-unification side sometimes invoke Confucian “Chinese values” to argue for cultural affinity with China, which pro-independence or decolonial scholars strongly contest. For example, when Taipei mayor Ko Wen-je stated in 2014 that he identifies as “a cultural Chinese” (though politically Taiwanese), it provoked backlash . Decolonial critics saw his statement as an echo of colonized thinking – the notion that culturally Taiwan must defer to Chinese civilization. Incidents like the toppling of a Sun Yat-sen statue in Tainan in 2014 by activists are symbolic rejections of that mindset . Sun Yat-sen (revered in ROC ideology as “Father of the Nation”) and Confucius have both been subjects of statue removals or protests, akin to how other countries remove symbols of past oppression. Meanwhile, some scholars advocate revisiting Confucianism through new lenses – for instance, comparing it with indigenous philosophies or Western theories to find common humanistic values. The key is that any engagement with Confucian tradition is now explicitly situated in a debate about national identity and power, rather than taken for granted. This open debate is itself a sign of decolonization: Taiwanese subjectivity is being formed through the ability to question and choose its cultural references, rather than inheriting “Chinese culture” as a sacrosanct given.

Indigenous Revitalization and Alternative Identities

• Indigenous Movements as Decolonial Strategy: Taiwan’s Austronesian Indigenous peoples (who comprise around 2–3% of the population today) have become central to the project of decolonizing cultural narratives. For decades, indigenous history and culture were marginalized by both Japanese and Chinese regimes. Now, reclaiming indigenous rights, languages, and representation is seen as crucial to Taiwanese subjectivity. It serves a dual purpose: rectifying historical injustices and challenging the myth that Taiwan has always been “Chinese”. The government and civil society have taken steps such as the presidential apology to Indigenous peoples (in 2016), creation of an Indigenous historical justice commission, official recognition of additional plains tribes (like the Siraya), and measures to return land or preserve sacred sites. These actions acknowledge that Taiwan was home to distinct nations and cultures long before any Han Chinese influence, thereby undermining Sinocentric claims. Anthropologists and historians have reframed Taiwan as part of the broader Pacific/Austronesian world, emphasizing its links to Polynesia, Southeast Asia, and the oceanic migration of its first peoples. Such reframing dilutes the notion of Taiwan as a mere offshoot of China and instead casts it as a multicultural crossroads.
• Forging a New Collectivity – “We are all Indigenous”? Interestingly, some Taiwanese (especially those of Hoklo/Hakka Han descent) have begun to embrace a narrative of shared Indigeneity. This does not mean claiming false aboriginal identity, but rather expressing solidarity by acknowledging that most Taiwanese are products of migration and colonial settlement. Scholar Chiu Kuei-Fen observes that the recent indigenous cultural revival converges with Han-Taiwanese efforts to “reclaim native roots” in forging a new Taiwanese identity distinct from China . In her analysis of indigenous literature, Chiu notes that the reclaiming of Indigenous identity in art runs parallel to Han Taiwanese symbolically indigenizing themselves – as a way to justify moving away from a Chinese identification and asserting a more rooted Taiwananness . This can be seen in trends like the popularity of Austronesian motifs, incorporation of Indigenous words and myths into mainstream media, and political rhetoric that stresses Taiwan’s native soil and native peoples. Some activists argue that the descendants of long-ago Han settlers (from the 17th century) are themselves “Indigenized” to Taiwan after hundreds of years, and thus should join with Austronesian tribes in a common identity narrative opposed to later Chinese colonization. While this view is debated (and caution is urged against appropriating Indigenous identity), it represents a creative attempt to redefine “Taiwanese” as fundamentally non-Chinese in origin. At the very least, there is broad agreement that Indigenous cultures must be respected as an integral part of Taiwan’s identity mosaic, not a footnote to Chinese culture.
• Affective and Spiritual Reorientations: Revitalizing Indigenous heritage also provides an affective counterweight to cultural China. For many young Taiwanese, learning an Indigenous dance or attending a tribal festival can be an act of decolonial affinity – a way to feel connected to Taiwan’s land and original peoples rather than to a distant Chinese civilization. The revival of aboriginal festivals (like Pasibutbut, the Bunun prayer ceremony) and the prominence of Indigenous singers and writers in pop culture have infused Taiwanese society with new symbols and stories. These developments function as what cultural theorist Stuart Hall might call new “points of identification.” Instead of only looking to Yellow Emperor worship or Confucian teachings (as earlier cultural policies did), Taiwanese can also locate themselves in the island’s Austronesian heritage or its unique ecological environment. The concept of “土地認同” (locality-based identity) has emerged, stressing belonging to the land of Taiwan itself – an idea that resonates with Indigenous worldviews. By embracing the island’s pre-Chinese past and non-Chinese cultural resources, Taiwan is performing a kind of epistemic decolonization: expanding the mental universe of what counts as “our culture.”
• Complexities and Ongoing Debates: Decolonizing cultural China via Indigenous revitalization is not without challenges. As highlighted in recent debates, even the process of recognizing Indigenous groups can spark contention. For example, efforts to officially recognize the plains tribes (like Siraya and Katagalan, who were sinicized early in history) have met resistance from some mountain tribes, due to worries about diluting resources or identities . The possibility of large numbers of Han-Taiwanese claiming Siraya ancestry complicates the picture . These debates force Taiwan to confront what decolonization means in a multi-layered settler society. Scholars note that “How to decolonize an island…home to dozens of distinct indigenous communities and unevenly colonized over centuries is a subject of fierce debate.” There is a delicate balance between honoring Indigenous sovereignty and using Indigeneity as a symbolic resource for the whole nation’s identity. Nevertheless, most agree that any vision of Taiwanese subjectivity that excludes the first peoples would be incomplete and fall back into a Chinese-centric narrative. Thus, the trajectory is to keep deepening Indigenous inclusion – whether through school curricula, bilingual signage in tribal languages, or giving political autonomy to Indigenous communities – as a continuing process of undoing the epistemic dominance of “Chinese” culture in defining Taiwan.

Contemporary Cultural-Political Stakes

• National Identity and Democracy: The debates over “cultural China” are not merely academic – they have real implications for politics and policy. At heart is the question: Is Taiwan a culturally Chinese nation or a plurinational, unique nation? This affects everything from constitutional reform to foreign policy. Those who lean toward a Chinese cultural identity often argue for closer ties or eventual unification with the PRC, framing decolonization efforts as “de-Sinicization” or even “cultural fascism.” On the other hand, advocates of Taiwanese cultural subjectivity see their work as bolstering Taiwan’s de facto independence and democracy. They contend that shedding the colonizing influence of cultural China is crucial for consolidating a civic Taiwanese nationalism that can resist PRC pressures . In the context of growing PRC aggression, strengthening a distinct national consciousness is seen as part of national security – a population that identifies wholly as Taiwanese will be more united against annexation. Indeed, Chinese state media frequently criticizes Taiwan’s language reforms or history textbook changes as “desinicization” plots, underlining that Beijing recognizes the power of cultural identity in this geopolitical contest.
• Public Intellectuals Leading the Conversation: Figures like Chen Kuan-Hsing, Chiu Kuei-Fen, and Wu Rwei-Ren – among many others – play dual roles as scholars and public intellectuals shaping the discourse. Chen’s calls for “Asia as method” and critiques of blind spots in both Chinese and Western narratives encourage Taiwanese to imagine their identity in a broader Asian context, rather than as a lonely “orphan” of China. Chiu’s work on Sinophone and indigenous literature provides concrete examples of how narratives can be restructured to empower the periphery (Taiwan) as a center of its own, rather than a periphery of China . Wu Rwei-Ren’s passionate arguments for a left-wing Taiwanese nationalism offer a vision of Taiwanese identity that is progressive, inclusive (eschewing ethnic chauvinism), and explicitly anti-imperial – opposing domination by any great power, whether China, Japan, or the US . These thinkers all grapple with the affective dimension too: Wu writes of the “historical nature of Taiwanese identity” and how recognizing its constructedness can actually fortify (not weaken) the case for independence , while Chen often invokes empathy and emotional understanding as bridges across divided communities . Such contributions ensure that the formation of Taiwanese subjectivity is an ongoing, reflective process – one informed by theory but grounded in lived experience and political necessity.
• Examples of Decolonial Culture in Practice: On the cultural front, we see many strategies of disidentification and re-identification playing out. The emergence of “New Taiwanese” (新台灣人) identity in the 1990s – a term popularized by President Lee Teng-hui – encouraged all residents of Taiwan, regardless of ancestry, to identify with Taiwan first. This inclusive civic nationalism was a direct challenge to the older “we are all Chinese” mantra. In education, the curriculum was revised to include Taiwanese history, geography, and literature as distinct subjects, breaking the monopoly of China-centered content . Street names and memorials have gradually shifted: for instance, Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall’s name and symbolism have been questioned, and some Chiang statues removed, reflecting a societal reckoning with the icons of Chinese nationalist colonization. Simultaneously, new symbols have risen – the use of the Formosan black bear, Austronesian designs, or even the color green (associated with pro-Taiwan causes) in official logos and events all signal a rebranding of national imagery. In pop culture, blockbuster films like “Seediq Bale” (about an aboriginal uprising) or the international success of author Wu Ming-yi foreground Taiwan-specific stories rather than Chinese civilizational themes. These cultural shifts feed back into politics by normalizing the idea that Taiwan’s identity is multi-faceted and fundamentally Taiwan-centered.
• Continuing the Decolonization Process: Despite significant progress, the task of decolonizing “cultural China” in Taiwan is ongoing and continually negotiated. Each election cycle, issues of language policy, name rectification (e.g. whether to rename the national airline and institutions to remove “China”), and history interpretation come to the fore. There are also generational differences – younger Taiwanese, having grown up after martial law, tend to have a stronger Taiwanese-only identity, while some older folks retain a dual affinity. The key challenge identified by scholars is to prevent the re-colonization of minds under new guises. For instance, as Taiwan increases exchanges with China or as Mandarin-led pop culture flows across the Strait, there is vigilance that it does not lead to a resurgence of cultural China ideology. At the same time, Taiwan must avoid isolating itself – hence the emphasis on global and Asian connections in place of a China-centric orientation . This is why concepts like Sinophone, Asia as method, and plural indigenization are so vital: they provide affirmative alternatives to both Chinese nationalism and Western dominance. Ultimately, the formation of Taiwanese subjectivity can be seen as a rich tapestry woven from postcolonial insight, psychoanalytic understanding of identity, and cultural studies critique. It is a conscious project of liberation – liberating the idea of “Taiwan” from being captive to “China” as an eternal reference. And as the scholars and examples above illustrate, this entails rewriting narratives, reshaping collective memories, and reimagining identity markers so that Taiwanese can see themselves as belonging first and foremost to Taiwan – a place with a Chinese cultural influence, certainly, but not defined or delimited by it. In short, decolonizing cultural China is about securing the ideological, historical, and affective freedom for Taiwan to define itself on its own terms in the contemporary world.

Sources: Contemporary analysis and historical accounts have been drawn from both English and Chinese language sources, including works by the cited scholars and writers. Key references include Chen Kuan-Hsing’s Asia as Method , Shu-mei Shih’s Against Diaspora , Wu Rwei-Ren’s Prometheus Unbound (as reviewed by Brian Hioe) , and critical essays from academic journals and local commentators that discuss Taiwan’s postcolonial identity struggles . These sources collectively illuminate the multi-dimensional efforts—historical, cultural, and emotional—behind the formation of a decolonized Taiwanese subjectivity in the face of “cultural China.” Each citation above corresponds to a specific idea or quote, underscoring the dialogue between on-the-ground developments and scholarly interpretation in this ongoing process.